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Most renewable energy sources are dependent on unpredictable weather con-
ditions, which have considerable variation over space and time. The intermittent
nature of this production means that any renewable energy prosumer may some-
times produce an amount of energy in excess of its local consumption needs and
sometimes in deficiency. This thesis is concerned with developing methods that
can improve the effectiveness and widespread adoption of renewable energy us-
age. In order for renewable energy to be more economically viable, there needs to
be a scheme for sharing energy among the prosumers so that those with excess en-
ergy can give their excess amounts to those in energy deficiency. That is the task
addressed in this thesis.
The way to deal with this problem is to setup an optimal arrangement of local
coalitions of renewable energy prosumers such that energy is shared within the
coalitions in an optimally efficient manner. As is formally explained early on in
this work, finding such an optimal coalition arrangement is an example of a Coali-
tion Structure Generation (CSG) problem. The most straightforward way to find
an optimal solution for a given pool of prosumer agents in these circumstances is
to examine every possible coalition partition (coalition structure) and evaluate its
comparative utility. This is known as “exhaustive search” (ES) and can be compu-
tationally expensive. As has been shown earlier, the number of such evaluations in
ES even for a pool of twenty agents can be in the tens of trillions.
The problem for us in the renewable energy domain is that, because of the con-
stantly changingweather conditions among the scattered prosumers, the CSG opti-
mization calculation must be carried out every hour of the day. This means that the
ES approach in the CSG optimization calculation for a reasonable number of pro-
sumer agents is computationally intractable. So a more computationally feasible
stochastic optimization method must be used, which searches through the coali-
tion structure search space in order to find a reasonably good solution even if it is
not the global optimum.
To this end a number of stochastic optimization search methods have been in-
vestigated in this thesis, including some of our own novel extensions to existing
approaches. These search methods have been examined with respect to two dif-
ferent connection arrangements with respect to the outside world – (1) when the
local prosumer networks have a connection to a public utility power grid and can
therefore buy needed energy (at a high price) from the grid and sell excess energy
ii
(at a low price) to the grid and (2) when the local prosumer networks are isolated
from any public utility, which is referred to as “island mode”. The overall goal
of these investigations has been to find an optimization approach that arrives at a
near-optimal (near the global optimum of the given search space) that is compu-
tationally efficient (i.e. it does not require a vast amount of computer memory or
running time).
Based on these empirical examinations, which have employed realistic parame-
ters drawn from existing consumption and renewable energy data sets, the follow-
ing conclusions concerning renewable energy can be drawn from this study:
• It is feasible to employ ordinary computer resources to obtain on an hourly
basis near-optimal energy-sharing coalition structures that will lead to more
effective and economical use of renewable energy.
• This energy-sharing approach will contribute to a more rapid adoption and
proliferation of existing renewable energy equipment and infrastructure.
The principal contributions towards these end that this thesis work has made
are as follows:
• Amodelling framework has been setup that can be used for extensive empir-
ical determinations of near-optimal energy-sharing coalition structures.
• A detailed empirical study has been carried out that has examined the rela-
tive capabilities in this context of various optimal coalition structure search
methods, including genetic algorithms (GA), dynamic programming (DP),
particle-swarm optimization (PSO), population-based incremental learning
(PBIL), and several variants to PBIL.
• The novel extensions to basic PBIL optimization have included Top-k Merit
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This thesis describes the design and evaluation of amodel that facilitates the effi-
cient sharing of electrical energy among a distributed network of energy producers
and consumers. This model is particularly suited for sharing energy from renew-
able resources, which by their nature have variable patterns of energy production.
Thus, the sharing arrangement needs repeated rescheduling as the weather and
consumption conditions frequently change. The model described here provides a
highly efficient method of calculating collective energy-sharing arrangements that
up untill now have been considered computationally intractable for a reasonable
number of agents.
The rest of this chapter provides some contextual background information for
the motivation for this work. Section 1.2 of this chapter briefly describes the issues
of global warming and why fossil fuels need to be replaced by renewable energy
sources. Section 1.3 gives a brief description of renewable energy characteristics,
particularly those associatedwith the two primary sources of renewable power gen-
eration – solar energy andwind energy. Following on fromwhat has beendiscussed
in Section 1.3, Section 1.4 describes why it is advantageous, both economically and
environmentally, to have renewable energy sources connected in a network. We call
a locally connected network of renewable energy sources a coalition, and in Section
1.5, we describe why it is necessary to frequently recalculate and reassign member-
ships of coalitions. This optimisation is the major research issue addressed in this
thesis: how to accomplish this optimal coalition membership calculation in an effi-
cient and scalable manner. Section 1.6 briefly summarises how this issue has been
addressed in this thesis andwhat our principal contributions in this area have been.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.2 Emergence of Renewable Energy
Throughout history, and still today, fossil fuels (such as petroleum, coal, and
natural gas) have been the primary sources to support the world energy require-
ments (Hubbert, 1949). Fossil fuels are known as depletion resources, that are only
available in limited locations. Therefore, due to their restrictive character, they have
caused a lot of political issues and economic conflicts in the world. Also, to make
matters worse, the combustion of fossil fuel to provide energy has brought substan-
tial greenhouse gases into the Earth’s atmosphere (Hoel & Kverndokk, 1996).
Since the early 1990s, remarkable scientific evidence and research results have
revealed that the globalwarmingphenomenon is a clear and inevitable trend (Höök
& Tang, 2013; Zou et al., 2016). Additionally, the consequential disasters being
caused by global climate change are looming (Lobell & Field, 2007; Weber, 2006).
Concerning the origin of global warming, most scientists confirm that greenhouse
gases, which are mainly produced by the use of fossil fuel, are the primary sources
which accelerate global warming (Capellán-Pérez et al., 2014; Ellabban et al., 2014;
Hoel & Kverndokk, 1996).
To eliminate fossil fuel production in order to mitigate the massive emission of
greenhouse gasses and to avert unprecedented catastrophes of the Earth’s ecosys-
tem, theUNadopted theUnitedNations FrameworkConvention onClimateChange
(UNFCCC) in 1992, aiming to “stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the at-
mosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system” (Bodansky, 1993)(p.455). Besides, to face the ees of climate
change and to realise energy sustainability and a cleaner air target, the requirement
to speed up the development of low-carbon energy technologies is becoming a pri-
mary subject worldwide (IEA, 2011; Zou et al., 2016).
Renewable resources (such as firewood, waterwheels, windmills and hot spring
heating) have long been used in human history (Sørensen, 1991). However, due to
the limitation of scientific knowledge and technology, except for hydro-power gen-
eration, a large portion of these abundant resources have been ineffectively utilised,
and some evenwere unavailable until a fewdecades ago (Manolopoulos et al., 2016;
Kelly, 2011). Nevertheless, arising from the concerns of global climate change and
with the substantial progress of science and technology in renewable energy (RE),
the exploitation and application of RE have now become part of mainstream re-
search in the goal of a sustainable future for the Earth and humanity (Hussain et
al., 2017).
Nowadays, the utilisation of RE has been widely acknowledged as one of the
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best solutions for substituting the massive utilisation of fossil fuel (Hussain et al.,
2017; Zou et al., 2016). The growth of RE generation, as shown in Figure 1.1, has
continuously increased the penetration of RE and gradually taken over fossil fuel in
energy supplies (Sequeira & Santos, 2018; Ellabban et al., 2014; IRENA, 2019). Fur-
thermore, from the Figure, it is clear that solar and wind have drivenmore capacity
among these resources in recent years.
(a) The share of renewable generation capacity.
(b) The growth of renewable generation capacity.
Figure 1.1: Statistics for global renewable generation capacity (IRENA, 2019)).
(Source: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Images/IRENA/Infographics/2019/Mar/
Accessed: 31 Dec. 2019.)
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1.3 The Nature of Renewable Energy Resources
From the previous section, we know that solar and wind energy have grown
more rapidly than other resources. This success is attributed to their natural char-
acteristics, economic scalability, and easy customisation for versatile consumers.
Sunshine and wind always surround us in our environment and are the most
convenient and available RE sources for human consumption. For example, a house-
hold can directly install solar panels (notably photovoltaic (PV) panels) on top of
the roof and integrate the solar power generator with the private power supply sys-
tem. Besides this, customers can also connect a personal power line to the public
grid via a smart meter (Kádár & Varga, 2012).
Nowadays, the traditional power distribution network is rapidly transforming
into a smart grid. A smart grid, as defined by the European Union Commission
(2010), “is an electricity network that can cost-efficiently integrate the behaviour
and actions of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do
both – in order to ensure economically efficient, sustainable power systems with
low losses and high levels of quality and security of supply and safety.”(p.3)
Accordingly, when there is sufficient energy generated by solar radiation, then
the household can fulfil the power consumption without the input from the public
grid. What is more, the customer might sell excess energy to the utility as well.
As a result, the solar power user could generate power to meet personal energy
consumption during the bright sunshine hours. However, the user may demand
power from the grid while there is less or no available solar source. Figure 1.2
shows a typical roof with installed solar panels in New Zealand.
Similar to solar energy, there are many commercialised wind turbines available
for a customer to select from. Consequently, the wind energy generated from tur-
bines can provide sufficient power for the users, or even contribute to the grid, while
the wind speed is fast and prolonged enough. However, like the solar user, wind
turbine users will need additional energy from the grid when the wind is mild or
still. Figure 1.3 (a) and (b) show pictures of the two selected wind turbine types
used to generate the simulated data for our experiments in the thesis.
To summarise, the kinds of energy generated from the renewable devices (such
as solar and wind) are convenient and produce no carbon pollution, but they have
the limitation of a smaller scale and the intermittent nature of energy production
in comparison with fossil fuels. Therefore, users will need to frequently buy from
and sell to the utilities on the grids. The spontaneous solution for solving this issue
is to install an energy backup system, notably batteries, to store the excess energy
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Figure 1.2: A typical roof with solar panels installed.
(Source:https://solargroup.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/solar-panel-roof-nz.jpg
Accessed: 31 Dec. 2019.)
for requirements in deficit hours. Hence, this additional cost of the backup system
will make the RE less profitable.
However, the utilisation of RE can bring forward the contribution of reducing
the pollution of greenhouse gases. As a consequence, some governments may pro-
vide subsidies to the users to encourage people to install RE facilities. Alternatively,
some co-operative models have been proposed for RE users to share their energy in
order to support the users to use the RE efficiently and economically.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
(a) Bergey (1 kW) wind turbine.
(Source: http://bergey.com/wp-content/gallery/excel-1/XL1Render2.JPG
Accessed: 31 Dec. 2019.)
(b) Eco (3 kW) wind turbine.
(Source: https://image.ec21.com/image/windsystem/oimg_GC04832269_CA04452851/
3kw-Wind-Turbine-Generator.jpg Accessed: 31 Dec. 2019.)
Figure 1.3: Two commercialised wind turbines used in our experiment.
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1.4 Prosumers and Networked Energy Sharing
A prosumer is a person who consumes and produces a product (Toffler, 1980).
Thus, in the application of smart grids, a consumer who also generates energy (no-
tably from renewable sources) is regarded as a prosumer. Note that the power line
of a local prosumer is still connected to the public network, which allows the pro-
sumer to trade with a provider (namely a utility) while it has an excess or shortage.
Generally, a RE prosumer is said to be amodelling agent in this study. For example,
a prosumer can be a household with a wind turbine or solar panels installed.
As discussed in Section 1.3, a prosumer will often have an excess or a deficit of
power so that it needs to tradewith the utility. However, the buy-back rates (paid by
the utility) aremuch lower than the purchase prices (paid by the prosumer) in some
countries, includingNewZealand (Philpott et al., 2019). Therefore, a prosumerwill
need to pay extra to the utility, even when the prosumer has, on average, generated
sufficient power.
For instance, let us assume a PV prosumer has generated PV power (e.g. 20
kWh) in the daytime on a sunny day and sells the extra power (e.g. 10 kWh) to
the utility. Outside the daylight hours, the prosumer has consumed power (e.g. 10
kWh)which is purchased from the utility. In this case, this prosumer has generated
sufficient power to meet the requirement in one day. However, due to the price
difference, this prosumer still has to pay an additional fee to the utility.
As mentioned, to avoid the prosumer selling power to the utility, one can install
an auxiliary storage (notably, a battery backup system) to store the extra energy for
when a shortage of hours arises. However, the storage is expensive and makes the
investment less profitable.
Alternatively, another preference is for the prosumer to share the energy with
others by forming a networked energy-sharing coalition. Therefore, suppose that
while some prosumers in the coalition have surplus energy, they will share the en-
ergy with others who require energy. Accordingly, while these prosumers are short
of energy, they can then be supported by other prosumers who have an excess.
Note that buying from and selling to the electric utility is less efficient andmuch
more costly than sharing energy among coalition partners. Thus, it is a better option
for a prosumer to join the co-operation of a coalition. Consequently, the prosumer
can be connected in a network with others in order to form a coalition for sharing
energy with others. Besides, the networked prosumers can still be connected to
the public grid or else operate in island mode. (Island mode refers to a distributed
power network that is applied in an isolated location where its operation is inde-
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
pendent of any national or regional power distribution network (IEEE, 2011; Saleh
et al., 2016).)
Hence, the problems of how to organise and operate the distributed agents of
small scale prosumers, such as households with solar panels or wind turbines, to
form decentralised power systems will be the primary consideration in this thesis.
In summary, the advantages for agents to form a networked energy-sharing
coalition are:
1. Sharing energy among a networked collection of prosumers to accommodate
their variable amounts of energy production and consumption can reduce the
need for expensive storage and can also facilitate community co-operation.
2. Because of their localised and distributed nature, a networked collection of en-
ergy prosumers does not have a single point of failure in the case of power fail-
ure. Thus, the coalition can not only share energy during the daily routine, but
also serve as an emergency support system while there is a blackout caused by
a catastrophic event.
3. Owing to the sharing mechanism, forming a coalition is economical and effi-
cient. Therefore, prosumer proliferation can support affordable and incremental
increases of renewable energy.
1.5. THE OPTIMISATION OF AGENTS’ COALITIONS 9
1.5 The Optimisation of Agents’ Coalitions
From the previous discussion, we argue that forming coalitions is one of the
best ways for RE agents to work together. Also, according to the variable weather
and consumption conditions, the demand and supply situation of agents may fre-
quently change. Hence, the electricity dispatch arrangementwill need to be periodi-
cally rescheduled (Dulău et al., 2016). Therefore, our goal is to design a model that
facilitates efficient energy sharing among a distributed network of energy agents
with recurrent demand and supply.
In our problem of forming coalitions, a coalition can be any non-empty sub-
set of an alliance with n agents, and a coalition structure is a partition of that al-
liance. However, the total number of possible coalition structures is exponential to
the number of agents n, and, more importantly, it is large, even relative to the num-
ber of coalitions (which is equal to 2n-1) (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011). To demon-
strate the challenge, let us consider a simple example. For instance, 15 possible
coalition structures can be formed for an alliance of four agents. When the number
of agents in an alliance is up to 10, the number of possible coalition structures will
reach 115,975. Thus, this coalitional model is usually not considered scalable for
a working alliance of agents. Therefore, an exhaustive search for evaluating every
possible coalition structure in order to find the optimal solution is impractical and
unfeasible, even for a small alliance such as a community with an hourly dispatch
schedule. Alternatively, other optimal algorithms may provide more prompt and
appropriate solutions to meet the requirements of scalability and immediateness.
This issue will be covered rigorously and in more detail in Chapter 2.
In order to make our proposed coalition model effective and practical, the re-
search objectives are listed below:
• Given the intermittent andmutable characteristics of agents, can a co-operative
model be designedwith specificmechanisms for an alliance of agents that can
internally exchange energy?
• To overcome the challenge of the rapidly growing number of coalitions, can
we propose an optimisation method to solve the design model within a local
area efficiently (e.g. a community or town), where the result can remain at or
nearly at an optimal level? Will thismethodfit the periodic electricity dispatch
arrangement without losing much accuracy?
• Can we improve the scalability while retaining the accuracy of the proposed
optimisation approach to solve a large-scale multi-region application?
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1.6 Contributions
Much of the work reported in this thesis is based on our three published papers
as listed below:
• Lee, S. H.-S., Deng, J. D., Peng, L., Purvis, M. K., & Purvis, M. (2017). Top-k
merit weighting pbil for optimal coalition structure generation of smart grids.
In international conference on neural information processing (pp. 171–181).
• Lee, S. H.-S., Deng, J. D., Purvis, M. K., Peng, L., & Purvis, M. (2018a). An
improved PBIL algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation of smart
grids. In workshop on data ming for energy modelling and optimisation,
damemo), the 22nd Pacific-Asia conference on knowledge discovery and data
mining (pp. 1–8).
• Lee, S. H.-S., Deng, J. D., Purvis, M. K., & Purvis, M. (2018b). Hierarchical
Population-Based Learning for Optimal Large-Scale Coalition Structure Gen-
eration in Smart Grids. In T. Mitrovic, B. Xue, & X. Li (Eds.), AI 2018: Ad-
vances in artificial intelligence (pp. 16–28). Cham: Springer International
Publishing.
The components of Chapters 1 to 3 (introduction, methodology and models) of
the thesis are extensions of these papers. Furthermore, the approaches and exper-
iments in Chapters 4 to 6 are extensions of each paper, accordingly.
In summary, this study proposes a model for prosumers to share energy inter-
nally. The solution not only gives consumers more incentive to become new RE
prosumers, but also encourages current prosumers to enlarge facilities to generate
more RE. This approach utilises the formation of coalitions, which is essential in
Co-operative Game Theory.
Furthermore, this thesis solves the coalitional formation problem by using the
Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) in Co-operative Game Theory. However, the
number of coalition structures (CS) is exponential to the number of agents. Tra-
ditional deterministic search methods, such as Dynamic Programming (DP), can
only solve the CSGproblemswith a limited number of agents because they demand
computer resources, such as memory and the number of iterations proportional to
the number of CS. Therefore, even though these approaches can guarantee finding
the exact (optimal) solution, they are still impractical in the applications of a large
number of agents. Alternatively, the Stochastic Optimisation (SO) approaches may
not guarantee reaching the exact solution, but they may provide relative optimi-
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sation solutions in applications which have a large agent number and repeatedly
require a solution.
Based on the aforementioned concept and motivation, this thesis contributes to
the following aspects:
• Based on Co-operative Game Theory, this thesis builds a coalition model for
an alliance of RE agents to share energy internally. This model could increase
the benefit for agents in the alliance through themechanismof energy sharing.
This mechanism can operate on both smart grids and off-grid. In both of the
operations, the agents within the alliance can obtain more benefits by sharing
energy with other members. Besides, if an alliance, such as a community, is
disconnected from the public grid because of a disaster, the energy sharing
model can still operate in island mode.
• Since the exhaustive search and its improved methods are inefficient and not
scalable for the application of our coalition model, we have proposed an im-
proved stochastic algorithm, named Top-kMeritWeighting Population-Based
Incremental Learning (PBIL-MW), to generate an optimal coalition model
which maximises the benefit of the alliance. When comparing existing state-
of-the-art methodswith the proposed PBIL-MWalgorithm, the latter not only
optimises power-sharing within the alliance in our experiments, but also out-
performs the methods by delivering faster running speeds and consuming
fewer computer resources.
• Furthermore, we have also proposed a new scalable approach, namely, Hier-
archical PBIL-MW (H-PBIL-MW), to solve a coalition formation with a large
number of agents in an extended region. Our results have revealed the promis-
ing potential of applying theH-PBIL-MWalgorithm to deal with co-operative
coalitions across extensive areas where there are constraints such as landform
restrictions in multi-areas which power-share.
• Theproposedmethod for sharing renewable energy among themembers (pro-
sumers) in an alliance can be directly applied to smart grids by repeatedly
forming coalitions. Consequently, prosumers can share renewable energy
with other members and may make more profit in comparison with trading
energy with the utilities.
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1.7 Organisation of Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows.
In Chapter 2, we introduce the research background, relevant concepts, and
theories; and their relevant literature is reviewed accordingly. Firstly, we briefly
present and explain the definition of a Coalition Formation and Coalition Structure
Generation (CSG) in Cooperative Game Theory. The detailed construction of CSG
is then illustrated, and the methods for solving CSG problems are correspondingly
discussed.
The relative methodology and concepts in this study are introduced and ex-
plained in Chapter 3. Concerning the research objectives of forming a co-operative
alliance, we analyse the incentives and models for forming the coalition structures.
Based on the analysis, the design of the coalition model has been set up, which cov-
ers several aspects, including coalition constraints, coalition evaluation, and sce-
narios for experiments in terms of different scales. In Section 3.4, the process of
obtaining and analysing the consumption profiles and the generating power of RE
is presented and demonstrated separately. Finally, the integration of both consump-
tion and generation information to obtain the prosumer’s data is explained.
Afterwehavedesigned the coalition structuremodel for solving the co-operative
multi-agent problem inChapter 4, we beginwith the leading experiments to demon-
strate the feasibility of the proposedmodel with a small number of agents. To solve
these experiments, we have utilised four approaches for comparison. Apart from
using the direct searchmethod and twopopular stochastic algorithmsmentioned in
Chapter 2, we propose an improved stochastic approach using Population-Based In-
cremental Learning algorithm with top-k Merit Weighting, namely, the PBIL-MW,
and a customised strategy for choosing the initial probability to solve the problem.
Empirical results show that our new proposed algorithm gives competitive perfor-
mance compared with some stochastic optimisation algorithms.
In Chapter 5, we demonstrate the superiority of our proposed stochastic algo-
rithm, i.e. the PBIL-MW for 20 agents, and compare the outcome with the results
we obtained by using a dynamic programming algorithm. Furthermore, to improve
our proposed algorithm presented in Chapter 4, we propose a customised geno-
type encoding scheme as an improved approach to finding the optimal coalition
structure of agents. Our empirical results show that the proposed approach gives
competitive performance compared with the exact solutions obtained by dynamic
programming.
In Chapter 6, we advance the problem to largemulti-region scales, e.g. 80 agents
1.7. ORGANISATION OF THESIS 13
in four urban areas. We know fromChapter 5 that our proposed algorithm, namely,
the PBIL-MW, could efficiently obtain an approximately optimal solution. Fur-
thermore, we propose a new approach, Hierarchical PBIL-MW with a termination
scheme, namely, theHi-PBIL-MW. In comparisonwith the PBIL-MW, the new algo-
rithmachieves significant efficiencywith only a small loss of accuracy. TheHi-PBIL-
MW algorithm has provided an alternative solution when the number of agents is
large, and the time restriction is an essential factor in some applications.
Finally, we conclude by summarising the contributions of this study and point
to some possible further directions in the last chapter.
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Chapter 2
Preliminary
This chapterwill firstly discuss the existing co-operativemethods for prosumers,
including the fundamentals of coalition structure generation and the solutions ap-
plied in this thesis. At the same time, a relevant literature reviewwill be presented.
Firstly, the co-operativemethods for prosumers (i.e. agents) will be introduced and
discussed. Then, the optimisation problem considered in this thesis will be defined.
In Section 2.3, we will introduce the traditional methods for solving optimisation
problems.
2.1 Co-operative Methods for Prosumers
Aspresented inChapter 1, the integration of REwith smart grids involves emerg-
ing decentralised power management systems which harmonise the requirements
and availabilities of all generators, customers, grid operators, electricity market
stakeholders, grid regulators, and so on (Siano, 2014; IEA, 2011). This increasing
trend of implementation has brought about enormous applications (Gungor et al.,
2013) and research (Stoustrup et al., 2019; Fadlullah et al., 2011) from all aspects, in-
cluding social welfare (Wolsink, 2012), global economics (Derksen &Weber, 2017),
political co-operation, management technologies (Derksen & Weber, 2017), envi-
ronment protection, and power grid security (Cuellar, 2013).
To summarise the existing smart grids’ research and applications, Yasir (2018)
has conducted a comprehensive literature review and classifies all research into
five domains: energy management, communication technology, system protection,
power storage and energy subsystem. Among those domains, one of the research
topics in energy management is focused on the optimisation of cost and profits. As
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will be discussed later in this section, our research concern is one of the essential
subjects about the optimisation of benefit. Therefore, as mentioned in Section 1.4,
the problems of how to organise and operate the distributed agents of small scale
prosumers, such as households with solar panels or wind turbines, to form decen-
tralised power systems will be the primary consideration in this thesis.
2.1.1 Coalition Formation
In game theory, a coalition is defined as a group (namely an alliance) of agents.
A coalition is formed by binding an agreement, committing to work together in or-
der to achieve a specific goal, such as increasing payoff or decreasing cost (Chalki-
adakis et al., 2011). Hence, under the definition, a grand coalition, i.e. the whole
group of agents, may be divided into the form of separated smaller coalitions to
pursue an optimal goal of the group (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008).
Bogomolnaia et al. (2019) summarised the Coalition Formation (CF) theory,
which is composed of two aspects. One is about how to partition the agents, and
the other involves the group’s actions. The researchers also provided a significant
number of articles which are related to CF theories and applications.
CF applies to almost every aspect in the world, such as political parties, electric-
ity markets, organisations for environmental protection, and the league of sports
teams (Bogomolnaia et al., 2019; Ray & Vohra, 2015).
Since the efficiency of wind turbines and solar PV panels keeps increasing, and
their installation cost keeps dropping, the penetration of them has experienced
rapid growth in recent decades (Sawin et al., 2014). However, due to the inter-
mittency of RE, prosumers may face a frequent shortage. As mentioned in Chapter
1, two conventional methods are either to trade with the power utility or to enlarge
the capacity of their backup storage (e.g. battery). However, both approaches are
costly. An alternative solution may be forming a coalition of prosumers to share
energy regularly and internally.
To improve co-operation among RE prosumers, some researchers utilise CF to
provide different strategies to share the RE among prosumers (Ellabban et al., 2014;
Rennkamp et al., 2017). For example, Yasir et al. (2013) proposed agent-based com-
munity co-ordination to reduce the power deficit of communities by forming some
co-operative groups, namely coalitions, based on the social aspect of sustainabil-
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ity by reducing the overall discomfort levels. Wolsink (2012) addressed the social
construction of smart grids. The contribution of a smart grid among prosumers is
optimised to collaborate and share RE in a co-operative micro-grid with mutual de-
livery. By using the Markov decision process, Mondal and Misra (2013) optimised
energy distribution by dynamically changing the size of the coalition in which the
number of customers in a single micro-grid varies. However, in Mondal and Misra
(2013), the power suppliers and consumers are separated, whereas in our study,
there are prosumers coalitions.
Apart from the above research, Saad et al. (2011) applied coalitional game the-
ory to study the co-operative strategies in distributed smart grids in order to min-
imise the total power loss. Chakraborty et al. (2014) extended the study of Saad
et al. and proposed a more scalable hierarchical coalition formation mechanism
which considered both power loss and price mechanisms.
However, these two articles focused only on finding coalitions to minimise the
power loss caused by power transportation in which the power loss is transferable.
Here, ‘transferable’ means that the payoff or utility can be freely transferred to any
agent in the coalition. Approaches to distribute the payoff equitably to agents are
called solution concepts such as the core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus (Pe-
ters, 2015). Thus, these methods belong to a coalitional game with transferable
utility (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008). Furthermore, as mentioned by Shoham
and Leyton-Brown (2008), the coalitions can be addressed as a single grand coali-
tion. To solve the grand coalition, the calculation of the Shapley value is efficient
for dividing the payoff of the grand coalition members among the agents.
2.1.2 Coalitional Game in Partition Form
Different from the transferable coalitional game, this thesis focuses on a non-
transferable problem, namely, the coalition structure generation (CSG), which is
based on the co-operative game theory (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011), aka “Coalitional
Game in Partition Form” (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008). The CSG works as a
multi-agent system,whose agents join together to form a specified partition, termed
the coalition structure (CS), for achieving an optimal solution of the overall benefit
for all the participating agents (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011).
In the multi-agent game, each agent is an autonomous, interactive and intelli-
gent software entity. In this thesis, agents act on behalf of the prosumers. Thus,
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agents can bring information and make decisions, just like the prosumers them-
selves. Furthermore, the intelligence of the agents includes functional mechanisms,
procedural strategies and other roles that work in the program (Wooldridge, 2009;
Chalkiadakis et al., 2011; Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008).
The key to finding the optimal solution is to optimise the CS. The goal for the
coalitions of a given alliance can be defined, such asmaximising the overall profit or
minimising the power loss. However, a grand coalition is generally inapplicable in
amulti-agent system. For example, RE sources, such as wind and solar power, have
intermittent energy outputs, so that they can be used to form temporary coalitions
in order to share their energy. For agents that have excess energy (i.e. they are
producing more energy than their local consumption) can provide the energy to
other members in their coalition who are facing an energy deficit.
For a broad alliance of agents producing RE, it then becomes an optimisation
problem as to what coalition arrangement will result in the optimal distribution of
available power. Such a co-operative mechanism for sharing the RE among agents
is also suitable in the case where agents behave unselfishly and volitionally bind
to an agreement to accomplish coalitions as a single system (Chalkiadakis et al.,
2011). In the following section, the CSG problem will be defined in detail.
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2.2 Coalition Structure Generation
TheCSG is a non-deterministic polynomial hard (NP-hard) problem(SanjeevArora,
2009), which means that there are no polynomial-time algorithms for solving the
problem. The larger the number of agents, the more the potential search domain
will increase exponentially. In the following subsections, the definition of CSG and
its estimation of the problem scales are presented, including the number of exclu-
sive subsets, partitions, and total coalitions.
2.2.1 Problem Definition
Suppose there are n agents, denoted by ai, i ∈ n. The set of all agents is denoted
by S, such that S = {a1, ..., an}. The term “coalition”, denoted byC(k,i), refers to any
subset, indexed by i, of which S contains k agents, where C(k,i) ⊆ S, C(k,i) 6= ∅. In
addition to S and C(k,i), a coalition structure is a partition of S and can be defined
(Chalkiadakis et al., 2011; Rahwan et al., 2015) by:
Definition 1. For any set S, a coalition structure, denoted by CS, is a partition of S,
and coalitions are subsets of CS, such that CS = {C(k,i), ..., C(k′,j)}, ∪CS = S,
and C(k,i) ∩ C(k′,j) = ∅ for any C(k,i), C(k′,j) ⊂ S, C(k,i) 6= C(k′,j).
In this thesis, each coalition is evaluated by the total payoff that the coalition can
get, denoted by v(C). This game is a characteristic function game of CSG proposed
by von Neumann (1944). Therefore, the value (or worth) of a CS is the sum of the
values of the coalitions C(k,i) in CS and can be defined (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011;
Rahwan et al., 2015) by:
Definition 2. For any coalition, C(k,i) ⊆ S, the value of a CS is denoted by v(CS)





Hence, the optimisation objective of the CSG problem (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011;
Rahwan et al., 2015) can be defined by:
Definition 3. The CSG problem is the optimisation problem of searching for an
optimal CS, denoted by CS∗, over S whose value is optimal. Mathematically,
a coalition structure CS∗ is said to be globally optimal if CS∗ gives themaximal
overall characteristic value:
CS∗ = arg max
CS∈F(CS)
v(CS), (2.2)
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where F(CS) denotes the whole collection of all possible CSs into which the
set S of n agents can be formed.
Thus, the size of F(CS) for S is denoted by |F(CS)|.
In this thesis, we focus on designing algorithms for solving the above problem
and endeavour to efficiently search for the optimal or near-optimal solutions.
2.2.2 Number of Exclusive Subsets
Given a set S of n agents, let C(k) denote any possible subset which contains k
agent(s) exactly and |C(k)| denote the total number of exclusive C(k), respectively.
From the binomial theorem, we know that:




which is a binomial coefficient. Consequently, the total number of all possible sub-
sets can be calculated by:
n∑
k=1
|C(k)| = 2n − 1, (2.4)
which is the sum of binomial coefficients, excluding the empty set.
Let us consider the set of 4 agents, S = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. There are:
• 4 subsets, |C(1)| = (41) = 4, containing 1 agent: {a1}, {a2}, {a3} and {a4}.
• 6 subsets, |C(2)| = (42) = 6, containing 2 agents: {a1, a2}, {a1, a3}, {a1, a4},
{a2, a3}, {a2, a4} and {a3, a4}.
• 4 coalitions, |C(3)| = (43) = 4, containing 3 agents: {a1, a2, a3}, {a1, a2, a4}
and {a2, a3, a4}.
• 1 grand coalition, |C(4)| = (44) = 1, containing all 4 agents:
{a1, a2, a3, a4}.
Therefore, the total number of possible coalitions equals 24−1=15.
2.2.3 Number of Partitions
Given a set S of n agents, let CS(m) and |CS(m)| denote any possible partitions of
S containing precisely m coalitions and their total number, accordingly. From the
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Combinatorics Theorem, we know that |CS(m)| is a Stirling number of the second
kind (Graham et al., 1989), and is given by:





(−1)m−j(mj )jn, 1 ≤ m ≤ n. (2.5)
Therefore, a set of 4 agents has
• {41} = 11!
1∑
j=0
(−1)1−j(1j)j4 = 1 CS(1) for the grand coalition, i.e.
{{a1, a2, a3, a4}}.
• {42} = 12!
2∑
j=0






CS(2) containing 2 subsets, i.e.
{{a1, a2, a3}, {a4}}, {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}}, {{a1, a3, a4}, {a2}}, {{a2, a3, a4}, {a1}},
{{a1, a2}, {a3, a4}}, {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}}, {{a1, a4}, {a2, a3}}.
• {43} = 13!
3∑
j=0
(−1)3−j(3j)j4 = 6 CS(3) containing 3 subsets, i.e.
{{a1, a2}, {a3}, {a4}}, {{a1, a3}, {a2}, {a4}}, {{a1, a4}, {a2}, {a3}},
{{a2, a3}, {a1}, {a4}}, {{a2, a4}, {a1}, {a3}}, {{a3, a4}, {a1}, {a2}}.
• {44} = 14!
4∑
j=0
(−1)4−j(4j)j4 = 1 CS(4) containing 4 subsets, i.e.
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3}, {a4}}.
Moreover, from Eq. 2.5 we can compute the number of the collection F(CS) of
all possible CSs for a given set S of n agents, denoted by |F(CS)|, which isB(n) and








The B(n) in Eq. 2.6 is known as a Bell’s number, which is NP-hard in computa-
tional complexity. Chalkiadakis et al. (2011) have proven that B(n) satisfies:
(n/4)n/2 ≤ B(n) < nn. (2.7)
Note that the bounds of Eq. 2.7 growmuch faster than the single exponential num-
ber. For example, B(3) = 5, B(12) = 4.213597 × 106, B(20) = 5.172416 × 1013 and
B(80) ≈ 9.913× 1086.
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2.2.4 Total Number of Coalitions
The total number T(k) of any k-agent subsets in the CS can be given by:
T(k) = |C(k)|B(n− k) = (nk)B(n− k), where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. (2.8)









In the 4 agents example, there are 6 (=(42)) subsets that contain 2 agents, i.e.
{a1, a2}, {a1, a3}, {a1, a4}, {a2, a3}, {a2, a4} and {a3, a4}. Moreover, there are twoCSs,
i.e. {{a1, a2}, {a3, a4}}, {{a1, a2}, {a3}, {a4}}, and both have the subset {a1, a2} in-
side; and there are another two CSs, i.e. {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}}, {{a1, a3}, {a2}, {a4}}
and both have the subset {a1, a3} inside, and so forth. Therefore, from Eq. 2.8, we
get T(2) = (42)B(4 − 2) = 12 which is the total number of subsets with just 2 agents
inside the 4 agents CS.
The calculation of T(k) and Ts(n), for the 4-agent CS case is tabulated in Table
2.1. Furthermore, the numbers of the CS, i.e. B(n) and Ts(n), where n is from 1 to
80, are shown in Table 2.2, and a plot is shown in Figure 2.1.
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80












Figure 2.1: Number of CSs and Ts in comparison with the number of agents.
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Table 2.1: Calculating Ts(n) by summing T(k) of a CS with n = 4 agents.
4-Agent set
k 1 2 3 4
|C(k)| 4 6 4 1
B(4− k) 5 2 1 1
T(k) 20 12 4 1
Ts(n) = T(1) + T(2) + T(3) + T(4) = 20 + 12 + 4 + 1 = 37
Table 2.2: No. of CSs and Ts(n) in terms of n-Agent.
Agent-size 1 2 3 4 10 20 40 80
B(n) 1 2 5 15 115,975 ≈ 5.172× 1013 ≈ 1.575× 1035 ≈ 9.913× 1086
Ts(n) 1 3 10 37 562,595 ≈ 4.231× 1014 ≈ 2.194× 1036 ≈ 2.377× 1088
Therefore, according to Eq. 2.9, the total number of inclusive subsets C(k,i) in
F(CS) with a set of 4 agents is 37. Figure 2.2 illustrates the classes and relations of
the CSs with 4 agents. The number shown on the right of the Figure represents the
partition size of the CS aligned with the same row. There are three characteristic
numbers related to the CS of a set S of agents, namely, the “number of exclusive
subsets C(k) in S”, the “number of partitions CS in S” and the “number of total
coalitions C(k,i) in S”.
To sum up, it can be observed that it is impossible to use traditional algorithms
such as a direct search or dynamic programming when the problem size becomes
large. However, there may be hundreds or even thousands of prosumers in an ap-
plication, so new methods need to be researched to tackle the problem.
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2.3 Related Work to Solve the CSG Problem
Since CSG can be considered as an optimisation problem, some state-of-the-
art algorithms for solving such kind of problems will be introduced. Firstly, two
classical methods, i.e. exhaustive search (ES) and dynamic programming (DP),
are introduced. These two algorithms provide the optimal solution for the problem,
but they become inapplicable when the size of the problem enlarges.
Next, the stochastic optimisation (SO) methods are described. SO methods are
a kind of stochastic algorithm that are based on a probabilistic search or nature-
inspired search behaviours. They make fewer or no assumptions about a problem
domain and can search in the vast space of candidate solutions (Beheshti & Sham-
suddin, 2013). SO algorithms are proposed for large-scale searches due to their
global exploration and local exploitation ability. SO algorithms are recommended
when enumerative techniques are difficult or even unable to find an exact solution.
Although SO algorithms do not guarantee finding an exact solution, they may
provide promising solutions with high efficiency and scalability (Rahwan et al.,
2015). They are alternative solutions to the CSG problem. The stochastic algo-
rithms discussed in this thesis include the genetic algorithm (GA), particle swarm
optimisation (PSO), and population-based incremental learning (PBIL).
2.3.1 Deterministic Method
Exhaustive Search (ES)
From Section 2.2, we know that the value of every CS is a discrete point in the
searching space. Thus, the direct way to find the optimal solution is to check the
value of every single point.
ES or the so-called brute forcemethod is a direct searchmethod, which searches
the whole search space for finding the optimal solution. Although it can obtain the
optimal solution, aka “exact solution” theoretically, it may take too long to find it
when the solution space is too large (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011).
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Dynamic Programming (DP)
Bellman and Dreyfus (1962) propose the original basic concept of using the DP
method. The DP method refers to re-constructing a complex problem by separat-
ing it into some elementary sub-problems in a recursive form. Hence, by recursively
searching for the optimal solutions to the sub-problems, a complex problem can be
solved exhaustively and optimally. In CSG problems, the first DP method was pro-
posed by Yeh (1986). It has an advantage over ES by employing re-use in problem-
solving. The approach of DP can be explained by using the lemma (Rothkopf et al.,
1998; Chalkiadakis et al., 2011) below.




max{v∗(C ′) + v∗(C ′′)}, v(C)
}
,
where C ′ ∪ C ′′ = C, C ′ ∩ C ′′ = ∅, C ′ and C ′′ 6= ∅.
When searching for the optimal coalition C∗, the partitions of C are considered
as two disjoint coalitions, i.e. the value of a grand coalition v(C) itself or the sum
of its 2-partition sub-coalition values v∗(C ′) and v∗(C ′′).
In return to Lemma 2.1, a flowchart is shown in Figure 2.3 to demonstrate the
process of DP.
The standard operation steps and an example for explaining the steps of DP are
given below.
• For all sets of singleton {ai|i ∈ n}, we compute the values of v({ai}) directly.
• For all coalitions of size 2, {ai, aj|i 6= j, i, j ∈ n}, we compute the values of
v({ai, aj}) and compare them to v({ai}, {aj}). Thus, the optimal v∗({ai, aj})
could be obtained.
• For the coalitions of size = k, 3 ≤ k ≤ n, the v∗(C(k)) could be obtained by
iterating over all partitions of size k − 1 based on Lemma 2.1.





k) = O(3n). For each k = 1, ..., n, there are (nk) coalitions of size
k, and for each coalition of size k, there are 2k−1 − 1 ways to split it into two non-
empty subcoalitions. Observe that 3n < (n/4)n/2 for large enough values of n—i.e.,
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this algorithm avoids searching all coalition structures. Moreover, its running time
is polynomial in the number of coalitions 2n
Byusing the 4 agents example, the fitness values of each subset ofC = {a1, a2, a3, a4}
are listed in Table 2.3, accordingly. Here, we adopt the fitness values gathered in
Rahwan et al. (2015)(p.145). According to Lemma 2.1, we then recursively cal-
culate the v∗(c) and the optimal c∗ for the subsets with 2 and 3 agents, which are
tabulated in Table 2.4.
By using Lemma 2.1, we can recursively calculate the v∗(c) and optimal c∗ for
the subsets of 2 and 3 agents, which are listed in Table 2.4.
Table 2.3: Subset of a 4 agents coalition and their fitness values
subset c Fitness v(c)
{a1} v({a1}) = 30
{a2} v({a2}) = 40
{a3} v({a3}) = 25
{a4} v({a4}) = 45
{a1, a2} v({a1, a2}) = 50
{a1, a3} v({a1, a3}) = 60
{a1, a4} v({a1, a4}) = 80
{a2, a3} v({a2, a3}) = 55
{a2, a4} v({a2, a4}) = 70
{a3, a4} v({a3, a4}) = 80
{a1, a2, a3} v({a1, a2, a3}) = 90
{a1, a2, a4} v({a1, a2, a4}) = 120
{a1, a3, a4} v({a1, a3, a4}) = 100
{a2, a3, a4} v({a2, a3, a4}) = 115
{a1, a2, a3, a4} v({a1, a2, a3, a4}) = 140
.
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Start
Compute and store fitness of
every coalition of size s=1
By using Lemma 2.1,
compute and store fitness of
every coalition of size s,
while 2 ≤ s ≤ n-1
s=s+1, if
s ≤ n-1
Update optimal structure of every
coalition of size s, i.e. max{v(c), (v(c′) +
v(c′′))}, where 2 ≤ s ≤ n-1
Store optimal structure and fit-
ness of every coalition of size s
Calculate fitness of
grand coalition v(C)
Update optimal fitness value v∗(C),




Figure 2.3: Flowchart of a Dynamic Programming Search
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Table 2.4: Best fitness and optimal coalition according to coalitions in Table 2.3
Best Fitness v∗ Optimal c∗
v∗({a1, a2}) = max{{v({a1}) + v({a2})}, v({a1, a2})}
= max{(30 + 40), 50} = 70 {a1}, {a2}
v∗({a1, a3}) = max{{v({a1}) + v({a3})}, v({a1, a3})}
= max{(30 + 25), 60} = 60 {a1, a3}
v∗({a1, a4}) = max{{v({a1}) + v({a4})}, v({a1, a4})}
= max{(30 + 45), 80} = 80 {a1, a4}
v∗({a2, a3}) = max{{v({a2}) + v({a3})}, v({a2, a3})}
= max{(40 + 25), 55} = 65 {a2}, {a3}
v∗({a2, a4}) = max{{v({a2}) + v({a4})}, v({a2, a4})}
= max{(40 + 45), 70} = 85 {a2}, {a4}
v∗({a3, a4}) = max{{v({a3}) + v({a4})}, v({a3, a4})}
= max{(25 + 45), 80} = 80 {a3, a4}




{v∗({a1, a2}) + v(a3)},
{v∗({a1, a3}) + v(a2)}, {v∗({a2, a3}) + v(a1)}
}
, v({a1, a2, a3})
}
= max{max{(70 + 25), (60 + 40), (65 + 30)}, 90} = 100 {a1, a3}, {a2}




{v∗({a1, a2}) + v(a4)},
{v∗({a1, a4}) + v(a2)}, {v∗({a2, a4}) + v(a1)}
}
, v({a1, a2, a4})
}
= max{max{(70 + 45), (80 + 40), (85 + 30)}, 120} = 120 {a1, a2, a4}




{v∗({a1, a3}) + v(a4)},
{v∗({a1, a4}) + v(a3)}, {v∗({a3, a4}) + v(a1)}
}
, v({a1, a3, a4})
}
= max{max{(60 + 30), (80 + 25), (80 + 30)}, 100} = 110 {a1}, {a3, a4}




{v∗({a2, a3}) + v(a4)},
{v∗({a2, a4}) + v(a3)}, {v∗({a3, a4}) + v(a2)}
}
, v({a2, a3, a4})
}
= max{max{(65 + 45), (85 + 25), (80 + 40)}, 115} = 120 {a2}, {a3, a4}
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Since there are 7 partitions, i.e. CS, in a 4 agents set that have 2 subsets, we get




{v∗({a1, a2, a3}) + v(a4)}, {v∗({a1, a2, a4}) + v(a3)},
{v∗({a1, a3, a4}) + v(a2)}, {v∗({a2, a3, a4}) + v(a1)},
{v∗({a1, a2}) + v∗({a3, a4})}, {v∗({a1, a3}) + v∗({a2, a4})},
{v∗({a1, a4}) + v∗({a2, a3})}
}




max{(100 + 45), (120 + 25), (110 + 40), (120 + 30), (70 + 80),
(60 + 85), (80 + 55)}, 140
}
=150
Finally, we obtain the maximal fitness value v∗(C) = 150. From the above C∗
list, we can deduce that CS∗ = {{a1}, {a2}, {a3, a4}}.
Even though the running time O(3n) of DP seems faster than the O(nn) of ES
(Chalkiadakis et al., 2011), DP still has an exponential number of CSs, i.e. 2n−1,
which is too slow in the application of CSG with a large number of agents. What is
worse, the program still needs to store the currentmaximal value and its CS, but the
memory requirement of DP is similar to its running time, about 2n−1 of memory,
for storing the values and their CSs. If n = 40, then 2n− 1 = 240− 1 ≈ 1.01×1012.
Hence, it will exhaust all the memory of a computer. Therefore, the DP algorithm
is quite slow in practice, though the computation of DP is less than ES.
In the applications of the CSG approach, one essential application domain for
CSG is disastermanagement (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011). Researchers such asKitano
(2000) developed a series of technologies based on DP that can rescue people in the
event of large scale disasters. Pechoucek et al. (2002) proposed a knowledge-based
approach to coalition formation by using DP algorithms to plan humanitarian and
peace-keeping missions. Note that the number of agents is 20 in Pechoucek et al.’s
(2002) study, whichmatched ourmaximumnumber of agents for theDP algorithm,
as mentioned in Chapter 5.
Many variants of research, based on the hybrid of DP and other search tech-
niques have been proposed. They are dedicated to improve the efficiency of solv-
ing a CSG problem (Rahwan et al., 2015). For instance, Sandholm et al. (1999)
presented a partial search algorithm which guarantees the solution to be within a
bound from the optimum. Changder et al. (2016) used heuristics to select the op-
timal values from sub-problems and chose the remaining unassigned agents from
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other sub-problems. Michalak et al. (2016) combined DP with a tree-search algo-
rithm to reduce the redundant process inDP and claimed that the approachwas the
fastest exact algorithm for complete set partitioning with O(3n). In addition to the
above studies, the DP procedures have also been improved and continued by many
researchers, including Dang and Jennings (2004), Service and Adams (2010), and
Banerjee and Kraemer (2010). However, these DP variant algorithms still consume
the running time exponentially and restrict their application to a limited number of
agents.
Further to the above approaches, we have shown in Section 5.5 that a reasonable
maximum of 20 agents can be used to apply DP in our experiments. However, we
have proposed a hierarchical approach in Subsection 6.4.2, which divides 80 agents
into four sub-areas (each has 20 agents) in order to obtain near optimisation.
2.3.2 Stochastic Optimisation (SO) methods
Genetic Algorithm (GA)
GA was inspired natural evolutionary processes with computer operation by
using recombination operators such as mating, crossover, mutation, elitism, and
tournaments to generate the new offspring (Holland, 1975).
Nowadays, GA has become one of the most popular SO algorithms with plen-
tiful applications in the literature. There are many applications of GA in smart
grids. For example, both Logenthiran et al. (2012), and Bharathi et al. (2017) used
the demand side management technique in smart grids to minimise power utilisa-
tion during the electricity rush hour by effectively distributing the power available
during the off-peak hour. Arabali et al. (2013) proposed a new strategy to meet the
controllable heating, ventilation, and air conditioning loadwith a hybrid-renewable
generation and energy storage system.
For the application of CSG, Sen and Dutta (2000) used an order-based GA as
a stochastic search process to identify the optimal coalition structure in randomly
generated optimal CS search problems. A genotype for a particular problem is rep-
resented as a fixed length of binary code. Hence, there are two different binary
codes (Sen & Dutta, 2000). Two different binary codes with the same length are
interpreted as two individuals with specified characteristics. Every individual in
the population is evaluated by a pre-defined fitness function.
The fitness typically corresponds to the value of the objective function in the op-
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timisation problem, which is defined over the genetic representation and measures
the quality of the represented solution. The fitness function is always problem de-
pendent. For instance, in the knapsack problem, one wants to maximise the total
value of objects that can be put in a knapsack of some fixed capacity. A represen-
tation of a solution might be an array of bits, where each bit represents a different
object, and the value of the bit (0 or 1) represents whether or not the object is in the
knapsack. Not every such representation is valid, as the size of objects may exceed
the capacity of the knapsack. The fitness of the solution is the sum of values of all
the objects in the knapsack if the representation is valid, or thr value is otherwise
0.
In some problems, it is hard or even impossible to define the fitness expression.
In these cases, a simulationmay be used to determine the fitness function value of a
phenotype (e.g. computational fluiddynamic is used to determine the air resistance
of a vehicle whose shape is encoded as the phenotype), or even interactive genetic
algorithms are used.
The regular procedures of a typical GA are described below:
I. Initialisation: A GA process starts with the generation of an initial set of n
probability vectors, denoted byX(ini), which is an array of random variables of
size n rows, aka vectors, and lengthm columns. The value xi,j of each element
is bounded by [0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1], such that Xi = [xi,1, ...xi,m|1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m]
(Koza, 1992). Therefore, a vector of threshold p is set for filtering the elements
of each row. While xi,j ≤ p, the mapped binary code will be 1, otherwise it will
be 0. Consequently, an initial population, denoted by S(ini), of binary sets with
size n rows and length m columns has been born. Accordingly, every sample
si of the binary code with length m is represented as its gene of a possible
individual. The fitness value vi, in terms of every individual, is computed by
the fitness function.
II. Selection (mating): After the first populationS(ini) with fitness values has been
created, the population keeps evolving by an iterative evolution process. The
process for propagating each newgeneration starts at the step ofmating. In the
step, each pair of individuals (parents) is selected for producing the offspring
(children). In general, there are many selection methods available for GA. As
Saini (2017) mentioned, the most commonly used selection methods include
the roulette wheel selection, the rank selection, the tournament selection, and
the Boltzmann selection. The method used in our study is the roulette wheel
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selection. The selection by this method is proportionate to the fitness of the
individual. Thus, the higher the level of fitness of an individual, the greater
the chances of being selected. Therefore, the fittest candidates of parents have
likely been chosen from the current population. In other words, individual
solutions are selected through a fitness-based process, where fitter solutions
are more likely to be selected. During the selection process, each pair of par-
ents is selected repeatedly until the number of pairs is equal to n/2 and the
population has n individuals.
III. Crossover: After the selection, the genotypes of any selected pair of individu-
als are modified to create a new pair using crossover. The pair of parents and
the new pair of offspring are then compared, and two of them are selected ac-
cording to better fitness. The procedure of crossover keeps iterating until the
number of individuals reaches n. Note that the ‘crossover’ is an operation that
exchanges some portion of the genotype of one chosen sample with the other,
and which performs the global exploration of GA as the new sample is differ-
ent from its parents. An example of crossover is shown in Figure 2.4 (a). The
chromosomes of the two individuals are S1 = (001100) and S2 = (101011).
After the crossover operation, the new individuals are S ′1 = (001011) and
S ′2 = (101100).
IV. Mutation: A small number of the new generations are picked to modify some
bits of genotype using mutation. Typically, less than 0.1% will be selected,
and only one bit of the genotype will be changed by mutation. An example of
mutation is shown in Figure 2.4 (b). Note that the ‘mutation’ is an operation
that changes a small segment, and typically, just a bit of genotype has been
changed (Marsland, 2015). Like crossover, mutation is an essentialmechanism
for GA optimisation for escaping local optima.
V. Elitism: The elitism operation is proceeded after crossover and mutation in
the iteration, which will keep the n best from the old population to substitute
n individuals in the new population. In general applications, n is set to 1. The
new generation of candidates is then used in the subsequent iteration of the
algorithm.
Finally, the algorithm terminates when the termination condition is met. This con-
dition can be a predefined maximum number of iterations, or an adequate fitness
value has been found from the population. For demonstrating the process of GA, a
flowchart is shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: Fig: Crossover and Mutation of Chromosomes
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Figure 2.5: Flowchart of a Genetic Algorithm
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GA is to maintain the best population (by way of crossover and mutation) from
breeding newgenerations, to realise the evolution process for searching for the opti-
mal solution. However, some researchers, such as Baluja and Caruana (1995), have
mentioned that when there are many local optima in the searching space, the GA
might be trapped in some local optima.
Furthermore, Larranaga et al. (1999) reviewed the different attempts made in
their experiments to solve the travelling salesman problem (TSP) by the GA. This
article has shown that for a TSP problem, there are many parameters provided for
the experiment in the choosing and tuning process and accordingly, towards im-
proving the result in terms of that specific TSP case. The TSP is known to be an
NP-hard problem and its running time has been proven to be bounded by O(n!)
(Bonomi& Lutton, 1984). Intuitively, the TSP ismore straightforward than the CSG
problem, which has an order O(nn) in computational complexity theory (Chalki-
adakis et al., 2011). Consequently, we argue that the GA approach might not be
practical to solve serial and periodical CSG problems, which are the problems in
this thesis for GA that always require choosing a set of suitable parameters before
running the program. The modification of GA in solving the CSG problem will be
presented in Chapter 4.
Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO)
PSO is another popular SOmethod that optimises a problemby iterativelywork-
ing to improve a candidate solution concerning a given fitness function. PSO was
first introduced byKennedy and Eberhart in 1995. It resolved a problem by creating
a population of competitor solutions, namely particles, and driving these particles
throughout the search-space in terms of a simple mathematical function over the
particle’s position and velocity.
PSO is widely utilised in the domains of smart grids and multi-agent systems.
For instance, Pedrasa et al. (2010) proposed a decision-support tool to optimise en-
ergy services provision by enabling end-users first to assign values to the desired
energy services and then schedule their available distributed energy resources to
maximise net benefits. After that, they used PSO to solve the optimisation prob-
lem of the decision-support tool because of its straightforward implementation and
demonstrated ability to generate near-optimal schedules within manageable com-
putation times. Saber and Venayagamoorthy (2012) used PSO in their paper to
minimise the cost and emissions problem. The problem is formalised in the re-
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source scheduling under uncertainty in a smart grid with RE and plug-in vehicles.
Mohamed et al. (2016) used PSO to maximise the system energy production and
meet the load demand with a minimum cost and the highest reliability.
The particular strength of PSO is that it has both better abilities of exploration
and exploitation to search for the optimisation in a continuous solution space. How-
ever, PSO is not very suited for problems in a discrete space such as CSG in our
study. However, Grisales-Noreña et al. (2018) proposed to use the Population-
Based Incremental Learning algorithm to locate distributed generators, i.e. a dis-
crete number of locations, and uses PSO to define the size of those devices, i.e. a
continuously adjustable amount. That article proposes a parallel implementation
of PBIL and PSO, which combines the strength of the two algorithms, and conse-
quently, has outperformed other algorithms.
However, in our unpublished research, we have used the PSO to solve the prob-
lem of minimising power loss. This problem is in the form of Coalitional Game
Theory for the co-operative prosumers and is compared to Saad et al. (2011).
In this thesis, we have adopted the binary PSO (BPSO) to solve the CSG prob-
lems.
Population-Based Incremental Learning (PBIL)
Inmachine learning, PBIL is an estimation of distribution algorithm. In essence,
PBIL is a variant of GAwhere the genotype (probability vector) of the entire current
population is evolved, rather than the evolution of individual members (Karray et
al., 2004). This algorithm is proposed by Baluja (1994). Because PBIL focuses only
on searching for a better estimation of genotype distribution for an optimisation
problem, they are without the need of some GA processes such as offspring and
crossover, and are consequently more resilient and flexible in many cases, which
leads to better and faster results than a standard GA (Baluja, 1994; Baluja & Caru-
ana, 1995; Lee et al., 2017).
In PBIL, each gene in the probability vector is represented as a random value in
the range of [0,1], representing the chance, compared to a given threshold value,
that any specific allele will appear in that gene. Figure 2.6 shows a flowchart to
demonstrate the process of PBIL. During the iterations, the algorithm only updates
the initial probability vector of the threshold, which is different from GA, and the
following generations are evolved, based on a new initial threshold vector through-
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out the process. The regular procedures of PBIL are described below:
1. Initialise the threshold vector (genotype): generate an initial threshold vector of
a fixed value of L-length genotypes. In typical cases, an equal opportunity 0.5 is
used, while in other cases the threshold may be chosen in the range of [0,1].
2. Generate a population of n random values of m length random genotypes: for
each sample, compare them length value to the threshold to forma binary vector.
3. Evaluate and rank the fitness of every sample.
4. Update the threshold vector based on some selected individual samples.
5. Repeat evolution procedure, i.e. steps 2 to 4, until a termination condition is met.
Because of the characteristics of PBIL, there are some applications using the
PBIL algorithm in the domain of smart grids. For instance, Folly and Venayag-
amoorthy (2013) applied a multi-population-based PBIL approach to a power sys-
tem controller design. The results of their simulation showed that themulti-population
PBIL approach performed better than the standard PBIL and was as effective as
PBIL where adaptive learning was used.
Grisales-Noreña et al. (2018) proposed a parallel implementation of using PBIL
to locate distributed generators and using PSO to define the size of those devices.
This approach utilised the parallel implementation of PBIL and PSO algorithms to
search for the optimal location and sizing of distributed generation for improving
the operation of electric systems. Their results demonstrated that the proposed par-
allel PBIL-PSOmethod provided the best balance between processing time, voltage
profiles and reduction of power losses.
As far as we know, our proposed research of PBIL algorithms is the first pub-
lication using the PBIL method to solve a CSG problem (Rahwan et al., 2015; Lee
et al., 2017). A more detailed explanation of how the process of searching for the
optimisation by PBIL and other improved algorithms will be discussed in Chapters
4 to 6.
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Figure 2.6: Flowchart of a PBIL algorithm
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2.4 Summary
As far aswe know, Rahwan et al. (2015) have themost comprehensive survey for
approaches to solve CSG problems. However, only a few SO approaches have been
shown in this paper, and the main reason is that such algorithms can not guarantee
finding an exact solution and not many papers have been published in this regard.
Our purpose is to find better SO algorithms to solve CSG problem, but it is not
possible to examine all the SO approaches. Therefore, a full review of all SO algo-
rithms is beyond the scope of this research. However, some popular SO algorithms
have been used to solve the CSG problems (Rahwan et al., 2015). For instance,
Shehory and Kraus (1998) proposed a decentralised greedy algorithm which iter-
atively overlaps small coalitions, starting from a singleton, and growing to a larger
size of coalitions. Although the greedy algorithm is comparably easy to implement,
like other greedy applications, its searching result is easily to be trapped in a locally
optimal solution.
In another study, Keinänen (2009) proposed a Simulated Annealing algorithm
to solve the CSG problem. In that paper, starting from the initial CS, the algorithm
recursively keeps searching for a better CS from their neighbourhood, until the ter-
mination of the program. Mauro et al. (2010) proposed another SO algorithm to
solve theCSGproblem. They present a greedy adaptive search procedure (GRASP)
algorithm to efficiently search the space of coalition structures in order to find an
optimal one. This new variant of the greedy algorithm shows a much better result
than Shehory and Kraus (1998) as Rahwan et al. (2015) mentioned.
To sumup, the DP and its many variant algorithms are not able to accommodate
the requirements for solving optimisation problemswith a high-dimensional search
space (Beheshti & Shamsuddin, 2013). In these problems, the search space grows
exponentially with the problem size. Clearly, using 80 agents as we do in Chapter
6 is beyond the practical scope of DP. As a result, for a large scale of CS, it remains
impractical to search for a global optimum using these approaches.
Although SO algorithms might only provide a near optimal solution, they have
been proven to be the faster algorithms in running time and have fewer computer
resource requirements. Moreover, they could still reach a reasonable and accept-
able optimal solution in applications with a large number of agents. The above
algorithms will be tested and compared with our proposed new algorithm in the
following chapters.
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Chapter 3
Co-operative Model for Prosumers
This chapter will construct and implement the coalition structure model for
the co-operative RE agents of an alliance in smart grids. Firstly, we introduce the
concept of forming coalitional models accompanied by the related literature. Fol-
lowing the discussion, the research design is illustrated and constructed, which
includes the constraints of the model and fitness evaluation in different consider-
ations. Based on the proposed model, we create two scenarios: one for local ap-
plications and the other for multi-region applications, respectively. The players of
the CSG games, i.e. agents of the prosumer, are depicted according to their power
consumption and production.
3.1 Models and Incentives in Forming Coalitions
On account of the intermittent nature of renewable energy, a prosumerwill need
to solve the balance of production and consumption frequently. One possible, but
not worthwhile, solution is to expand the capacity of backup storage, such as in-
creasing the battery size, to meet the needs during the deficit hours. Consequently,
this will raise much more investment expense and discourage the prosumer from
upgrading the RE facilities. Alternatively, most prosumers chose to trade with the
utilities so they can sell the excess to them and purchase the shortage from them.
In general, many of the current utilities in power trading markets have offered
RE prosumers different price rates to sell and buy-back the power (Alderfer et al.,
2000). For example, the buy-back rates of solar power1 are much lower than the
1https://mysolarquotes.co.nz/about-solar-power/residential/solar-power-buy-back-rates-nz/
Accessed: 31 Dec. 2019.
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selling prices2 in New Zealand. Similarly, the buy-back rates are much lower than
the purchase prices in some other countries (Philpott et al., 2019; IEA, 2017). Conse-
quently, it is becoming less profitable for a prosumer to sell the excess to the utility.
Similar to the current RE prosumers, a usual consumer who wishes to install a
RE device will face the quandary of choosing a moderate combination of generator
and backup system. For example, for a new prosumer with solar energy, the larger
area of PV panel will bringmore energy in sunshine hours. However, the prosumer
will also need to consider investing in more extensive but costly backup storage to
store the excess energy as much as possible or installing a small size of storage and
selling the excess to the utility with the low buy-back price.
Therefore, supposewe can provide a co-operativemechanism for the prosumers
to form an alliance that allows those surplus prosumers to share their excess energy
with others, and in return receive power when they have a shortage. On a financial
basis, the prosumer will firstly incline toward sharing the power in the alliance for
increasing a higher profit and achieving a more significant RE utilisation percent-
age.
Following the above concept, this mechanism not only can mitigate the expense
but alsomay bringmore economic incentive for prosumers. As a result, this mecha-
nismwill attract more consumers to become prosumers and encourage current pro-
sumers to enlarge their facilities for fulfilling their long-term power requirements.
Based on the concept above, under the emerging techniques, such as smart
grids, smart meters and the internet of things, the agents of prosumers can now
communicate and deliver power with others willingly, and accordingly, can coor-
dinate instantly in order to form co-operative coalitions.
Theoretically, these approaches are known as Co-operative Games, aka ‘Coali-
tional Games’ (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011), which allow players, i.e. agents, to estab-
lish agreements in terms of choosing the strategies and distributing their payoff. In
addition to the co-operative games of smart grids, there are twomajor topics which
are related to our problems.
The first is how to build a reasonable, co-operative model to formalise the coop-
eration, such as ‘Induced Sub-graph Games’ (Deng & Papadimitriou, 1994), ‘Net-
2https://www.switchme.co.nz/ Accessed: 31 Dec. 2019.
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work FlowGames’ (Kalai & Zemel, 1982), ‘Weighted Voting Games’ and ‘Coalition
Structure Generation Games’ (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011).
The second topic is how to evaluate different coalitions by the characteristic
function, aka utility, for comparing various coalitions and searching for the optimal
solution. For example, Pitt et al. (2012) propose a voting function with satisfaction
value for agents to achieve a better balance of utility and fairness. Bourazeri and
Pitt (2018) suggest a mechanism by attributing rewards of social capital for agents.
Saad et al. (2011) use strategies of a power loss function in distributed smart grids
in order to minimise the total power losses.
Based on the discussion above, the following section will explain the reasons in
selecting our model and bringing forth a price scheme for coalitions evaluation in
our proposed model.
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3.2 Design of Coalition Model
3.2.1 Related Work of Forming Coalitions
In terms of the forms of coalitions, some researchers such as Yasir et al. (2015)
propose a dynamic coalition formation for an agent to join any coalition with its
own decision which depends on the consideration of moderating the discomfort
level; Bourazeri and Pitt (2018) suggest agents pursue rewards of social capital from
coalitions. Nevertheless, it would be hard to measure their quantity while forming
coalitions by such abstract types of concept. For example, the perception of dis-
comfort level, like the feeling of hunger, might have a significant difference between
agents; the reward of social capital is an abstract concept based on many principles
of sociology which need lots of studies and consensus concerning common-pool
resources (Pitt et al., 2012). As a result, such schemes could be favourable in the
power grids of islandmodes (IEEE, 2011)which frequently lack the support of pub-
lic utilities. However, they might not be the most attractive strategies in coalition
formation when the agents are connected to the public grids. Alternatively, assum-
ing that the economic factor is the primary consideration formost of the prosumers,
the strategy of price incentive might be the most efficient method.
3.2.2 Proposed CSG model to Form Coalitions
Following the related work mentioned above, this thesis proposes a new co-
operative model by using CSG to form coalitions. Additionally, notwithstanding
that the prosumer wishes to be self-sustaining, every agent may occasionally face
a shortage because of the intermittent outcomes of the RE generators. When there
still exists a notable price difference in power trading markets, it is apparent that
having a scheme of sharing the power with a lower price for exchanging power
among the prosumersmay provide a better alternative solution. Typically, by form-
ing an alliance or group under an agreement to exchange energy with others in
the alliance will provide an adequate mechanism to achieve the scheme. Besides,
such a scheme will present a favourable, plausible and more economical method in
comparison with enlarging the facility (such as by adding wind turbines or solar
panels), installation of more backup storage, or trade with the power company. So,
our goal is to improve the power-sharing among agents by introducing more eco-
nomic incentive and, as a result, to stimulatemore consumers to become prosumers
and to support current prosumers to expand their facilities for fulfilling their long-
term power sustainability. We then consider several factors to design our model for
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experiments as follows:
• Equity and Fairness: We assume that every agent who is willing to participate
in the coalitional alliance should generate sufficient RE to meet its require-
ment in the long term. For example, it is compulsory to have a proper solar
panel installed to generate adequate energy in supporting the annual power
consumption, and likewise a fair yearly balance for wind turbine agents and
other types of prosumers as well.
• Sharing before trading: For the mechanism to keep working adequately and
efficiently, every agent in the alliance needs to provide the power information
internally to the alliance. Thus, the alliance will estimate and form optimal
coalition structures based on the information. Accordingly, all the “excess”
agents should provide power for the “deficit” agents in the same chosen coali-
tion before selling to the utility.
• Stability and steadiness: The proposed model can be working in on-grid or
off-grid mode. Even if the model is running by an on-grid alliance, however,
during a disaster period while the connection to the public distribution sys-
tem is disconnected, the agents with excess may keep supporting the deficit
agents while the internal connection still exists. Note that while in the off-grid
condition, if the demand is higher than the supply, it will cause a voltage drop
which will make the network unstable. Given this reason, the model requires
that the alliance should provide stability and steadiness while the mechanism
keeps running. Therefore, the alliance can form any feasible coalition which
must have a net power surplus in order to prevent the network voltage from
dropping and resulting in unstable fluctuation.
• Minimised power demand before request: Furthermore, we require that a
deficit agent should have an obligation tominimise its essential power need at
the given period such that the remaining surplus agents can benefit as many
deficit agents as possible.
Definition of Alliance: In our proposed co-operative model, an alliance is defined
as a group of participating agents under the agreement of the approvals mentioned
above.
According to the shifting requirements in various conditions, the alliance might
form several different coalitions to achieve an optimal solution tomaximise the total
benefits of the alliance. More importantly, to avoid causing unstable fluctuation
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within the smart grid, we require that a feasible coalition should still be a coalition
with a net surplus.
Following the rules of forming coalitions, each formed coalition cannot freely
transfer the utility value, i.e. profit, to other coalitions. Therefore, our model is a
coalitional game with non-transferable utility (NTU) (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011).
Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008) mentioned that these NTU games ‘explicitly list
all the divisions that are possible and prohibit the rest’. Furthermore, from the def-
inition of CSG in Subsection 2.2.1, we know that our proposed model is the model
of a CSG problem.
For our CSG problem, we will explain the constraints of forming coalitions and
the methods of computing the utility values of coalitions in the following subsec-
tion.
Constraints of Coalitions
For every period (i.e. per hour in this study), any agent ai with extra power
can share its surplus with others who are experiencing a shortage within the co-
operative alliance. The goal of the alliance is to maximise the total benefit by form-
ing coalitions, as shown in Eq. 2.2. Furthermore, we require that a deficit agent
should have an obligation to minimise its essential power need at the given period
such that the remaining surplus agents can benefit as many deficit agents as possi-
ble. Based on the obligation and to avoid causing unstable fluctuation within the
smart grid, the alliance can form any feasible coalitionwhichmust have a net power
surplus.
For instance, suppose the agents a1 and a2 each has 1.5 and 0.9 kWh excess ac-
cordingly, but a3 has a shortage of 1.2 kWh. According to the requirement, a1 and
a3 can team up as a feasible coalition {a1, a3}. On the other hand, a coalition such
as {a2, a3} is not accepted.
Under the constraint above, we further know that once the whole alliance has a
net power surplus at a given hour, such that all the deficit agents can obtain their
power requirement, this will lead to a grand coalition (Shoham & Leyton-Brown,
2008) and become a trivial solution for the CSG game. Thus, we consider only cases
with a net power deficit for the alliance where a grand coalition is unfeasible, and
a game of CSG should be constructed and needs to be resolved.
Further to the proposed power-sharing scheme, some power loss will happen
with the power transportation among the agents. However, when the distance be-
tween agents is short (which is the local scenario described in Section 3.3), then the
loss is trivial and can be neglected. On the other hand, for a multi-region scenario,
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the power loss constraint will be taken into account in our model as described in
Chapter 6.
To explain the constraints applied to local and inter-regionmodels, wewill present
the evaluation function and discuss the difference in the following subsection.
Coalition Evaluation
I. Profit Evaluation Functions for Cooperation approach:
For a set of k prosumers, denoted by C(k), at a given hour, letQis andQjb denote
the amount of power an agent has in excess or shortage respectively. The prices
for a prosumer to purchase from or sell to the utility are denoted by Pb and Ps
severally. We know thatPb is higher thanPs, such thatPb > Ps. LetQ(s)denote
the sum of power for agents with excess, and Q(b) denote the sum of power
for agents with shortage accordingly. For demonstrating the difference for the
agent to cooperate or not, we need to compute the sum of currency v(C(k)) for
the set respectively.
A. Non-cooperation:
In this circumstance, v(C(k)) is the sum of surplus agents selling Qis power
to the utility minus the sum of deficit agents purchasing Qjb power from





















= [Q(s)× Ps]− [Q(b)× Pb] .
(3.1)
B. Cooperation:
Suppose the prosumers can share the power within the set, then the net
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Therefore, the prosumers will share the power internally before they trade
with the utility. Hence, there are two conditions that need to be consid-
ered.
a. Net Deficit:
While there is not enough power to meet the demand, i.e. Q(k) < 0,
then the set still needs to be purchased from the utility. In this status,
the sumof currency v′(C(k)) is the net amount the set needs to purchase












= [Q(s)× Pb]− [Q(b)× Pb] ,
(3.3)
since we know Pb > Ps, such that [Q(s) × Pb] > [Q(s) × Ps]. From
Equations 3.3 and 3.1 we get
v′(C(k)) = [Q(s)×Pb]− [Q(b)×Pb] > [Q(s)×Ps]− [Q(b)×Pb] = v(C(k)),
(3.4)
which means the cooperation will bring a benefit, i.e. pay less to the
utility. Consequently, let v∗(C(k)) denote the net profit for the agents
with cooperation in comparison with the agents without cooperation.
LetQd represent the amount that the set can share internally, and this is
equal toQ(s) in this condition. And let Pr = (Pb−Ps) denote the price
difference byway of tradingwith power utility. Again, from Equations
3.3 and 3.1 we know
v∗(C(k)) = v
′(C(k))− v(C(k))
= {[Q(s)× Pb]− [Q(b)× Pb]} − {[Q(s)× Ps]− [Q(b)× Pb]}
= [Q(s)× Pb]− [Q(s)× Ps]
= Q(s)× (Pb − Ps)
= Qd × Pr .
(3.5)
b. Net Surplus:
While there is enough power to support the demand, i.e. Q(k) ≥ 0,
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then the set needs no purchase from the utility. In this situation, the
sum of currency v′′(k) is the net amount sold to the utility with price












= [Q(s)× Ps]− [Q(b)× Ps] .
(3.6)
Sincewe knowPb > Ps, such that (−1)×[Q(b)×Pb] < (−1)×[Q(b)×Ps].
From Equations 3.6 and 3.1 we get
v′′(C(k)) =[Q(s)× Ps]− [Q(b)× Ps] >
[Q(s)× Ps]− [Q(b)× Pb] = v(C(k)),
(3.7)
which mean the cooperation will bring more profit. Consequently, the
Qd is the amount that the set can be share internally, and is equal to
Q(b) in this condition. Again, from Equations 3.6 and 3.1 we know
v∗(C(k)) = v
′′(C(k))− v(C(k))
= {[Q(s)× Ps]− [Q(b)× Ps]} − {[Q(s)× Ps]− [Q(b)× Pb]}
= (−1)× [Q(b)× Ps]− (−1)× [Q(b)× Pb]
= Q(b)× (Pb − Ps)
= Qd × Pr
(3.8)
In summary, no matter what the net amount Q(k) is, the net profit v∗(C(k)) is
always better than agents without cooperation. Thus, we know
v∗(C(k)) = Qd × Pr, (3.9)
for all situations.
To demonstrate the profit of Eq. 3.9, let us examine two short examples, both
having a set of two agents {a1, a2}. The prices for agents to sell and purchase
power with the utility are 20 and 50 (¢/kWh). In the first example, let us
assume a1 and a2 have surplus 0.5 and -0.4 (kWh), separately. For non-co-
operative mode, the sum for trading with utility is given by 0.5×20+(−0.4)×
50 = −10 (¢). In our co-operative mode, the agents can share power by the
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price of the selling price. Since the net power (0.5 − 0.4 = 0.1) is positive,
the sum is given by (0.5 − 0.4) × 20 = 2 (¢). Hence, the net profit is given
by 2 − (−10) = 12. Furthermore, by using Eq. 3.9, we can compute the profit
which is given by 0.4× 30 = 12, where Qd = 0.4 and Pr = 50− 20 = 30 (¢).
Again, let us have a second example. Suppose the two agents a1 and a2 have
surpluses 0.3 and -0.4 (kWh) separately. For non-co-operative mode, the sum
for trading with the utility is given by 0.3 × 20 + (−0.4) × 50 = −14 (¢). In
the co-operative mode, the agent a1 can share 0.3 (kWh) power to a2 by the
price of the selling price. Since the net power (0.3 − 0.4 = −0.1) is negative,
the sum is given by (−0.1) × 50 = −5 (¢). Hence, the net profit is given by
(−5) − (−14) = 9. Furthermore, by using Eq. 3.9, we can compute the profit
which is given by 0.3× 30 = 9, where Qd = 0.3 (kWh) and Pr = 30 (¢).
II. Coalition Fitness Function:
Following the Definition 2 in Subsection 2.2.1, for any coalition Ck in a CS , i.e.





Besides, let us assume the prices for any prosumer to purchase from or sell to
the utility are denoted by Pb and Ps respectively. Further we know that Pb is
higher than Ps, such that Pb > Ps . For convenience, let Pr = (Pb−Ps) represent
the price difference by way of trading with the power utility. Therefore, in our
study, v(C(k)) is the fitness function of C(k) given by
v(C(k)) =

0 if k = 1,
Qd × Pr if k > 1 and Q(C(k)) ≥ 0,
−9999 otherwise,
(3.11)
where k denotes the size of coalition C(k), Qd is the total power need for deficit
agents in the C(k), and Q(C(k)) is the net surplus within the C(k) accordingly.
Furthermore, for giving penalty to an unfeasible coalition, we let v(C(k)) =
−9999.
Therefore, we aim to find the global best CS∗ and its optimal profit, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. For instance, let a1 and a3 each have 1.5 and 0.6 kWh
excess respectively, but say a2 has a shortage of 1.1 kWh. In terms of the re-
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quirement, a1 and a2 can form a feasible coalition {a1, a2}. On the contrary, a
coalition such as {a2, a3} is not rewarding. Therefore, a grand coalition can-
not always be feasible and a model of CSG (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008)
should be constructed and needs to be resolved.
III. Advanced Coalition Evaluation Function with Power Loss Constraint:
Besides the price scheme, there is another factor we need to put into consider-
ation, and that is the power transmission loss. Theoretically, there are two types
of power loss; the first one is the loss caused by the transmission lines, and the
other is due to the voltage changing process via transformers. Following is a brief
discussion of the power losses concerned in this study.
The transmission of power Pij between any two locations i and j will always be




= I2ij · α · dij + βPij,
(3.12)
where i and j stand for the locations of power sent and received respectively, Rij
is the resistance of transmission lines between i and j, Iij is the current flowed, β
is the fraction of power lost in the transformer at a substation during the voltage
changing process, α is the resistance of wire per unit length, and dij is the distance
between i j. For a power distribution line with fixed transmission voltage V , the






In connection with Eq. 3.13, we choose the typical values of α = 0.2 Ohm/Km, V =
22kV and β = 0.02 (Saad et al., 2011) as the parameters in the power transmission
function. For a co-operative model, there are two conditions under consideration:
(i) While the surplus power is shared locally, there is no power transferred via









× 10−6 × dij × P 2ij ≈ 4.13× 10−9 × dij × P 2ij. (3.14)
A distance in the local area is usually less than 10 km, and the hourly gen-
erated and consumed energy for a prosumer is usually less than 10 kWh in
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our experiments. For example, suppose agent a1 has 10 kWh to share with a2.
The distance between them is 10 (km). Thus, from Eq 3.14 we can compute
the power loss, which is given by 4.13 × 10−9 × 10 × 102 = 4.13 × 10−6kWh.
Therefore, we know the value obtained from Eq 3.14 is trivial and can be ne-
glected in our local scenario, which is described in the next section. Hence
we can directly obtain the total power needs, Qd, for deficit agents from the
fitness function Eq. 3.11.
(ii) When the surplus is shared with other locations by way of transformers and
transmission lines, we still need to use Eq. 3.13 for computing the power loss.
Similar to the local model, the distance between inter-region is usually less









× 10−6 × dij × P 2ij + β × Pij.
(3.15)
Again, the power loss caused by transmission lines is still trivial and neglected
in our inter-region scenario. Thus, Eq. 3.15 shifts to
Lij ≈ β × Pij, (3.16)
where β represents the power loss caused by the number of transformers,
denoted by n, between the two agents; therefore, β is equal to 0.02× n. Con-
sequently, we put the constraint of Eq. 3.16 into the calculation of Qd when
the two agents belong to different regions in Chapter 6.
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3.3 Coalitional Scenarios Setup
To compare the accuracy and efficiency, and to demonstrate the ability of our
proposed algorithms comparedwith other algorithms, we need to put forward var-
ious experiments on different scales of CSG. Thus, there are two scenarios of coali-
tions suggested in this thesis, namely local coalition structure and regional coalition
structure.
3.3.1 Scenario of Local Coalitions
Figure 3.1 shows the power connection of local coalition structure. In this sce-
nario, we assume that the agents of the RE prosumers are located within a distribu-
tion grid, e.g. a community or district, which could provide power-sharing directly
by the distribution network. From Eq. 3.14 we know that the transmission cost
and power loss are trivial; thus the loss is ignored in this scenario (Lee et al., 2017,
2018a).
Figure 3.1: Power Connection for Scenario of Local Coalitions
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3.3.2 Scenario of Regional Coalitions
In terms of the previous scenario, to demonstrate the ability on a large regional
scale, such as multi-city, we further extend the distribution of agents to four re-
gional areas as shown in Figure 3.2. Thus, the power-sharing within an inner area
remains the same as the local scenario. However, power-sharing across inter-areas
needs to be sent by a high voltage transmission network by way of transformers for
exchanging power between distribution and transmission lines. From Eq. 3.16 we
know that the power loss caused by the short distance electrical lines is trivial. So,
to simplify the coalition model, only the power losses of transformers, β=2% each,
per step up or down via a transformer, are consequently calculated.
Figure 3.2: Power Connection for Scenario of Regional Coalitions
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3.4 Modelling of Agents in Smart Grids
Whether the current energy status of an agent is in excess or shortfall depends
on the prediction of power conditions which the agent will generate or consume
in the next period. This study utilises real readings of smart meters and weather
records from the data of New Zealand (NIWA, 2019).
In the following subsections, the process for obtaining and analysing the con-
sumption profiles and the generating power of RE will be presented and demon-
strated separately. Finally, we will explain how we integrate the consumption and
generation into hourly condition data for the prosumers used in these experiments.
3.4.1 Power Consumption Data
To examine the electricity consumption data of households, we obtained half-
hourly household readings (48×366 records) of 240 smartmeters fromNewZealand
smart grids in 2008 (Nair & Zhang, 2009).
Figure 3.3 showsdiverse variations, and an average of 40 randomly chosen house-
holds in 24 hours. Generally, it is clear to see that there are some daily peak hours
of average power consumed, such as morning and afternoon activities.
Figure 3.4 shows the histogram of half-hourly consumption of these 240 agents.
From the figure, it is clear that the distribution is a log-normal distribution which
has coincided with some human behaviours (Galli, 2009).
The data of power profiles will provide hourly consumption for the agents in
the following experiments. Meanwhile, the accumulated annual power usage for
each agent will provide the reference when we choose the proper size of the PV
panel and the wind turbine for coupling the agent to become a prosumer in the
experiments.
3.4.2 Renewable Energy Data
Among those resources of RE, wind and solar are widely utilised and have the
most commercialised devices for electricity supply to meet the consumption of pri-
vate houses. Therefore, this study has chosen wind turbines and PV solar panels to
be the renewable resources in experiments. Furthermore, both the wind speed and
solar radiation hourly data are obtained from the New Zealand National Institute
of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA)3.
3Meteorological data obtained from NIWA’s National Climate Database
(https://cliflo.niwa.co.nz/ Accessed: 31 Dec. 2019.).
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Figure 3.3: Half-hourly consumption profiles of 40 households.
Furthermore, for simplicity, the meteorological data used in our experiments
are from four urban areas located in the South Island of New Zealand, namely,
Dunedin, Balclutha, Middlemarch and Ranfurly. The first two urban areas are lo-
cated in a windy coastal zone, and the other two are based in the sunny Central
Otago region. The distance between these urban areas is approximately 40 to 80
km. Therefore, both wind speed and solar radiation have 24 × 366 × 4 recordings
in our experiment.
Wind Energy
The general method to convert wind power into electricity is by using wind-
turbines. Therefore, for estimating the achievable wind energy that could be gener-
ated, one needs to measure the power output of commercialised wind turbines in
terms of the wind-speed. The approaches of obtaining wind energy for prosumer
to utilise are listed below:
I. Wind-speed data collection and analysis:
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 represent the various characteristics, e.g. peak hours and
wind-speed spread range, between urban areas, which reveal the potential for
cooperation between urban areas as well.
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Figure 3.4: Histogram of half-hourly consumption data.
The wind-speed data of NIWA were usually measured at heights of both 5
and 10 meters4. To simplify the estimation, we assume that the wind-speeds
were all measured at the height of 10 meters, which is much lower than the
heights of commercialised wind turbines, we assume they are all installed at
the height of 30 meters. To estimate the expected wind-speed at the height of
wind turbines fromNIWA’s measured speed, we adopt the logarithmic profile
equation(Oke, 2002). The logarithmic profile equation is generally used in the
lowest 100meters to describe the vertical distribution of horizontalmeanwind-
speeds within the lowest portion of the planetary boundary layer (Oke, 2002;
Nfaoui, 2012). The equation to estimate the mean wind speed Vz at height z














where vfr is the friction velocity, k is the Von Kármán constant (k ≈ 0.41), Ψ
is a stability term, and z0 is the surface roughness (in meters), and, L is the
4https://www.niwa.co.nz/atmosphere/research-projects/estimating-design-wind-speeds-in-
complex-terrain Accessed: 31 Dec. 2019.
58 CHAPTER 3. CO-OPERATIVE MODEL FOR PROSUMERS













Figure 3.5: Hourly Wind-speed profile in a year
Obukhov length from Monin-Obukhov similarity theory. As mentioned by
Pasquill (1961), under neutral stability conditions, z/L = 0 and Ψ drops out,










In Equation 3.18, roughness length z0 is a corrective measure to account for
the effect of the roughness of a surface on wind flow and is between 1/10 and
1/30 of the average height of the roughness elements on the ground. Over
smooth, open water, we expect a value around 0.0002m, while over flat, open
grassland z0 ≈ 0.03m, cropland z0 ≈ 0.1−0.25m, and brush or forest z0 ≈ 0.5−
1.0m, where values above 1m are rare and indicate excessively rough terrain.
Again, to simplify the estimation, we assume that the default z0 = 0.4m in the
estimation.
ByusingEquation 3.18, themeasuredwind-speeddata, i.e. 10m above ground,
are transferred to the expectedwind-speeddata, i.e. 30m above ground,where
the turbines are to be installed. Figure 3.7 shows the measured and expected
wind-speed within a set of 24-hour data for the selected urban areas.
II. Wind-turbines types and fitness:
Currently, there are many commercial wind-turbines available for small scale
generation, namely micro-generation, in terms of assorted individual house-
hold power consumption. From these, this study chose three types, i.e. 1, 3
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Figure 3.6: Wind-speed Histogram
and 6 kW wind turbines, to meet the needs of private annual electricity con-
sumption while integrating with the wind-power available in its area (Olsen
& Preus, 2015). Figure 1.3a and 1.3b show pictures of two of the selected types
of wind turbine. Theoretically, each turbine has its specified power generating
curve depending on variouswind-speed and usually has been provided by the
manufacturer with experimental data. For our experiments, these data were
gathered from the manufacturers (Bergey, 2012; Suneco, 2015) and have been
converted into the fitness function. Figure 3.8 shows the fitted power output
curves in terms of various wind speed according to the three types of commer-
cialised wind turbines.
III. Wind-power estimation by wind-speed:
In terms of the four selected urban areas, the possible generated wind energy
can be estimated by using the wind-speed at the turbines, respectively. Conse-
quently, this study establishes the hourly wind power data of the three types
of turbines in four urban areas. Figure 3.9 shows the profiles of hourly wind
power in one randomly selected week according to the four urban areas and
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Figure 3.7: Wind-speed profile of measured (at 10 m) and estimated (at 30 m).
the three turbines. Table 3.1 shows the estimation of the total wind-power gen-
erated in one year for each of the four urban areas and three turbine types.
Table 3.1: Annual wind-power being generated by different turbines.
Turbine Type Urban AreaDunedin Middlemarch Ranfurly Balclutha
Bergey 1_kW 1362.59 897.01 968.17 1016.06
ECO 3_kW 3515.23 2448.68 2486.68 2607.00
Bergey 6_kW 7271.90 4832.17 5139.52 5433.97
Unit:kWh
Solar Energy
The most popular method for harvesting solar radiation is to install the solar
PhotoVoltaic (PV) panel (Branker et al., 2011). Accordingly, for estimating the
achievable solar energy that could be produced, one needs to evaluate the power
output of the commercialised PV panel in terms of the solar radiation. The ap-
proaches of gathering solar energy for prosumers to utilise are listed below:
I. Solar data collection and analysis:
Same as for the wind-speed data, our radiation source was received from the
NIWA NZ for the same chosen urban areas. Figure 3.10 and 3.11 depict the
different solar profiles of the four urban areas and the characteristics of the
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Figure 3.8: Power output by 3 types of commercialised Wind-Turbines
10-minute average profile calculated in one year. Again, the different solar
extents encourage these regional areas to share energy among them. Compa-
rable to the wind energy estimation, since the hourly radiation has been given
for every city, we can compute the annual sunshine hours and the total solar
radiation accordingly, as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Annual sunshine hours and total solar radiation.
Urban Area
Dunedin Middlemarch Ranfurly Balclutha
Sunshine hours 4145.00 4222.33 4263.67 4223.67
Total radiation (kWh/m2) 1209.31 1345.41 1561.32 1285.65
II. PV panel types and fitness:
Comparable to wind turbines, there are many commercialised types of PV
panel available for small scale generation in terms of miscellaneous private
power consumers. However, unlike the wind generators, the PV prosumer
has more flexibility to choose the appropriate panel size, which is based on
the modularised panel unit, to meet their needs. Therefore, instead of assign-
ing the turbine types, we estimate the area (m2) of the PV panel to be installed
based on the number of PV units the prosumer required. The required num-
ber of PVunits is evaluated according to the locations and the annual electrical







































Figure 3.9: Hourly wind-power generated by types of turbines in one week.
consumption for each prosumer. Figure 1.2 shows a typical roof with solar-
panel installed.
III. Solar-power estimation by radiation:
Again for our estimation, we choose a global formula to estimate the electric-
ity generated for the output of a photovoltaic system (Photovoltaic-software,
2018). The equation of the formula is:
E = A× r ×H × PR, (3.19)
where E = Energy (kWh), A = Total solar panel Area (m2), r = solar panel
yield or efficiency (%), H = Annual average solar radiation on tilted panels
(shadings not included), and PR = Performance ratio, coefficient for losses
(range between 0.5 and 0.9, default value= 0.75). Furthermore, to standardise
the computation concerning each solar prosumer’s number of installed pan-
els, we select a commercialised PV panel5 to be the unit. Thus, the prosumer
only needs to calculate the number of the panels based on the power consump-
tion and the annual radiation of the city where it is located. The parameters
used for the estimation are A = 1.956m2, r = 0.177, H may refer to Table 3.2
5https://www.solartradesales.co.uk/Cache/Downloads/Data-Sheet-SunEdison-Mono-Silver-
SE-R335BMC-39.pdf Accessed: 31 Dec. 2019.























Figure 3.10: Profiles of 10-minute solar radiation in two days.
Table 3.3: Annual solar radiation and unit generated power.
Urban Area
Dunedin Middlemarch Ranfurly Balclutha
Radiation (kWh/m2) 1209.31 1345.41 1561.32 1285.65
Generated power (kWh) 313.85 349.18 405.21 333.67
and PR is given by
PR = 1− Il − Tl −DCl − ACl − Sr − Lw − Ld − Lo, (3.20)
where Il (Inverter losses) = 0.08, Tl (Temperature losses) = 0.08, DCl (DC
cables losses) = 0.02, ACl (AC cables losses) = 0.02, Sr (Rate of Shading) =
0.03, Lw (Losses at weak radiation) = 0.03, Ld (Losses due to dust, snow...)
= 0.02, Lo (Other Losses) = 0.0. Consequently, we get the annual generated
power by PV in the urban areas, as shown in Table 3.3.
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Figure 3.11: 10-minute average radiation profiles calculated in one day.
3.4.3 Modelling of Prosumer Agents
Following the treatment above, to couple the generated REwith electrical power
expenditure for forming the dataset of prosumers, we have matched hourly con-
sumed and generated electricity of the 240 households in the year 2008, respectively.
The approaches of creating the data of prosumer agents are listed below:
I. Partitions of Prosumers:
We have a set of 240 hourly consumption data, and we have divided the data
into two 120-agent groups as the wind and solar energy prosumers separately
via random selection. Again we randomly split each 120-prosumer set into
four equal partitions in terms of the urban areas.
II. Wind-turbines assignment for the 120 prosumers:
For every prosumer, the type of wind turbine is assigned according to its en-
tire power consumption balanced to the total generated wind power of the
turbine types at the specific location. Thus, the type is chosen so that its out-
put is the closest one to meet the consumption. For example, for an agent a1
with 3280 (kWh) consumption inDunedin city, fromTable 3.1we identify that
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the proper wind-turbine type is ECO 3_kW . Accordingly, we have computed
the hourly power conditions for everywind-turbine agent based on the hourly
power profile, wind-speed and the assigned turbine type. Consequently, we
have obtained a set of 120 prosumers with power conditions data. The condi-
tion of each agent at a given time indicates whether it is in the state of excess
or shortage, the related power amount and the located city.
III. PV panel number estimation for the other 120 prosumers:
For each prosumer, the number of panels, denoted by n, is estimated in terms
of its full generated solar power by thenpanels at the specific locationmatched
to total power consumption. Hence, the number is decided so that its output
is the closest one to match the consumption. For instance, for an agent a2 with
2560 (kWh) consumption in the town of Ranfurly, from Table 3.3 we com-
pute that the proper panel number is 6. Subsequently, we have calculated the
hourly power conditions for every solar agent based on the hourly power pro-
file, solar radiation and the number of panels. As a result, we have obtained
the other set of 120 prosumers with power conditions data accordingly.
IV. Prosumer agents for experiments:
For all the CSG experiments in this thesis, every set of power conditions for the
n agents, denoted by S = {a1, ...,an}, is randomly selected within the hourly
240-agents data in the year 2008. The only requirement, as mentioned in Sub-
section 3.2.2, is that any feasible coalition must have a net power surplus, i.e.
{a1, ...,an} ≥ 0.
Figure 3.12 shows the integration process of obtaining the hourly net-power
profiles of one prosumer with Turbine (left) and one prosumer with solar PV
(right) in 24 hours. Figure 3.13 shows the integration process of obtaining
the hourly net-power profiles of 40 randomly selected prosumers in 24 hours.
The upper part of Figure 3.13 shows the power consumption profiles. The
middle part in the figure shows the power generated by wind turbines and
solar PV panels. Consequently, we can get the hourly net-power profiles by
adding these two parts’ data. The resulting net-profiles are shown in the lower
part of the figure. Following these hourly results for all agents, the generated
data of conditions for every agent, i.e. the status of surplus or deficit and its
electricity amount respectively, will be used in the following chapters.
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Figure 3.13: Hourly net-power profiles of 40 prosumers in 24 hours.
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3.5 Outline of Experiment Processes
I. Binary scheme specification:
In order to find the optimal Coalition Structure (CS), the ES and DP algo-
rithms can directly compute the values of any CS. However, for our selected
SO algorithms, we need to create binary encoding schemes to map the CSG
to the corresponding bit-length, such as the connection scheme described in
Chapter 4 and the Set-ID scheme applied in the next two chapters.
II. SO algorithms selection and improvement:
To solve the binary optimisation problems, we have adopted some popular
binary SO algorithms, such as GA, Binary PSO and PBIL. Furthermore, when
applying the SO algorithm, we have attempted to improve efficiency and ac-
curacy by using enhanced algorithm, such as algorithms of the PBIL-MW and
the Hierarchical PBIL-MW.
III. Parameters and sample size selection:
In order to apply the SO algorithms, we have done some preliminary analyses
to choosemoderate parameters (such as crossover andmutation-probability),
initial probabilities (i.e. thresholds) and population size before we proceed
with the experiments. Note that we have used the same set of initial probabil-
ities and population size in all adopted SO algorithms to compare the results.
IV. Experiment and comparison:
In the experiments in the following three chapters, the deterministic search
algorithms (i.e. ES and DP) only need to compute once. Furthermore, while
applying the SO algorithms, we have used the same population size and initial
probabilities for distinct observations and to obtain mixed results.
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented our co-operative model and incentives along
with some literature reviews, explained the process of designing the proposed CSG
problems, described the scenarios from a local scale to a regional scale, and demon-
strated the process of obtaining the power conditions data. As the outline in Section
3.5, all these sections will provide the fundamental models, alternative scenarios,
and underlying hourly RE data for our further exploration in the following experi-
ments.
Chapter 4
PBIL-based solutions for CSG
In the previous chapter, we have proposed the coalitional model of energy-
sharing agents in smart grids. Consequently, we will start the implementation of
the model within a local scale in this chapter. Firstly, we explain the form and con-
straints of the co-operative model in Section 4.1. Later in Section 4.2, several algo-
rithms, including our proposed approach PBIL-MW, for solving the CSG problems
are introduced. The experiments and results are shown in Section 4.3. In the exper-
iments, four chosen algorithms are examined and compared using several sets of
agents, which are randomly selected from the data obtained in Section 3.4. In the
last section, a summary and conclusion of this chapter are provided.
In general, our proposed PBIL-MW could obtain the exact solutions the same as
the DS methods while outperforming DS in the efficiency. The result of this chap-
ter demonstrates notable performance enhancement over the traditional methods.
Some components of this chapter are extensions of our paper (Lee et al., 2017).
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4.1 Coalition Model in Local Smart Grids
By following our proposed coalitionalmodelmentioned in Section 3.2, we know
that ourmodel is a CSG problem. For instance, let us assume an alliance of 4 agents,
from Equation 2.9 and Table 2.1 we know that there are 15 possible CS. Therefore,
the goal of the alliance is to search for an optimal CS, which has the maximal fitness
value.
In this chapter, we will explore the feasibility of an alliance to form exclusive
coalitions for maximising the profit. Therefore, we start the experiment by em-
ploying the alliance in the scenario of a local smart grid, which was mentioned in
Subsection 3.3.1. In this scenario, we assume that the agents of the prosumers are
located within a distribution grid, e.g. a community or district, which could pro-
vide power-sharing directly by the distribution network.
4.1.1 Constraints of Coalition
For consistency, this chapter adopts the constraints of coalition mentioned in
Subsection 3.2.2. Thus, we consider only cases with a net power deficit for the al-
liance where a grand coalition is unfeasible, and a game of CSG should be con-
structed and needs to resolve accordingly.
For every period (e.g. per hour), any agent ai with a surplus can share its energy
with deficit oneswithin the team. The goal of that team is to optimize themaximum
benefit by forming a coalition. Also, for the stability of a smart grid, we demand
that every feasible sub-coalition must have a net power surplus.
For example, a1 and a2 each has 1.2 and 0.7 kWh surplus respectively, but a3 has
a deficit of 0.9 kWh. With a net joint surplus, a1 and a3 can form a feasible coalition
{a1, a3}. On the contrary, a coalition such as {a2, a3} is unfeasible.
4.1.2 Coalition Evaluation
Same as the constraints of a coalition, the coalition evaluation follows the one
in Subsection 3.2.2. Furthermore, this chapter is focused on a local coalition, such
as within a community. Therefore, from Equation 3.14 we know that the transmis-
sion cost and power loss are trivial, thus the loss is ignored in this scenario. For
convenient reference, the fitness function for coalition evaluation is summarised as
below.
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Let S denote an alliance of n co-operative agents, and Ck represent a coalition
which is a subset of S . A coalition structure CS is a partition of coalitions, where
CS = {C1, C2, · · · , Cm} such that ∪kCk = S, Ck 6= ∅ and Ck ∩ C ′k = ∅, if k 6= k′. The
goal of our model is the optimisation problem of searching for an optimal CS, de-
noted by CS∗, over S whose value is optimal. Mathematically, a coalition structure
CS∗ is said to be globally optimal, if CS∗ gives the maximal overall characteristic
value:
CS∗ = arg max
CS∈F(CS)
v(CS), (4.1)
where F(CS) denotes the whole collection of all possible CS into which the set S of
n agents can be formed. Thus the size of F(CS) for S is denoted by |F(CS)|. From
Equation 2.6 we know that |F(CS)| is the Bell’s number B(n).
Furthermore, let us assume the prices for any prosumer to purchase from or sell
to the utility are denoted by Pb and Ps respectively. The values of prices used in the
experiment are Pb = 40 and Ps = 20 (¢/kWh). Thus we know that Pb is higher
than Ps, such that Pb > Ps . For convenience, let Pr = (Pb − Ps) = 20 (¢/kWh)
represent the price difference by way of trading with the power utility. Therefore,
in our study, v(C(k)) is the fitness function of C(k) given by
v(C(k)) =

0 if k = 1,
Qd × Pr if k > 1 and Q(C(k)) ≥ 0,
−9999 otherwise,
(4.2)
where k denotes the size of coalition C(k), Qd (≥ 0) is the total power need for
deficit agents in the C(k), and Q(C(k)) is the net surplus within the C(k) accordingly.
Furthermore, for giving penalty to an unfeasible coalition, we let v(C(k)) = −9999.
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4.2 Algorithmic Solutions
4.2.1 ES
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the ES systematically enumerate all achievable
candidates of CS and discover the optimal CS∗ with the best fitness throughout the
entire solution space. Aswe know that an ES is not an efficient way to solve the CSG
problem with a large number of agents. However, in the preliminary experiment
of our proposed model, we need to compare the accuracy and efficiency between
stochastic algorithms and the direct searchmethod. Therefore, for obtaining the ex-
act solution in the experiment, this chapterwill use ES to find the optimal CS and set
its value to be the ground truth as the algorithmic paradigm in results comparison.
To carry out the ES computation, letS denote the set, i.e. the alliance, ofn agents,
and CSi denote one possible CS in whole CS(n) space of S. In addition, let us rep-
resent the fitness values of the current CSi by v(CSi), and denote the best CS and
its fitness so far by CS′ and v′(CS) respectively. The procedure of ES is executed by
systematically searching for the optimal CS, denoted by CS∗, which has the optimal
fitness v∗(CS). The pseudocode of ES is shown in Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1 Exhaustive Search
1: Evaluate the fitness of the grand coalition, v(S), let CS′ = S and v′(CS) = v(S)
2: repeat
3: Systematically select one achievable CSi in the CS(n)
4: Compute fitness v(CSi)
5: IF v(CSi) > v′(CS), set CS′ = CSi and v′(CS) = v(CSi)
6: until every achievable CSi is evaluated
7: Update CS∗ = CS′ and v∗(CS) = v′(CS)
8: Output v∗(CS) and CS∗
4.2.2 Genotype Encoding for Stochastic Optimisation
Before we can enable the SO algorithms to proceed in a CSG problem correctly,
the first procedure is to represent the CS by a length of a binary vector.
For an alliance of n co-operative agents, let ai denote an arbitrary agent and Ci,j
denote the connection between ai and aj . The graph of the connections between
agents is shown in Figure 4.1. Numerically, when ai and aj are connected then
Ci,j = 1, otherwise Ci,j = 0.
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Let l denote the total length of connection vector required for indicatingwhether
any two agents are connected or not. Hence,that l is given by:
l = (n− 1) + (n− 2) + ...+ 2 + 1 = n× (n− 1)
2
. (4.3)
Furthermore, let s denote the number of samples, namely population, used for
SO algorithms. Consequently, the binarymatrix needs for computing SO algorithm
is a s× lmatrix. For further details, the reader may refer to Example 4.2.
4.2.3 GA
The program and encoding scheme of GA is thoroughly explained in Subsec-
tion 2.3.2. Since there are many variants of GA in real applications, this study
follows the method of Marsland (2015). Again, let s denote the number of sam-
ples and l denotes the total length of connections. The parameters used here are
crossover=uniform, mutation-probability=1/l. The running process, i.e. pseu-
docode, of GA, is shown in Algorithm 2:
Algorithm 2 Genetic Algorithm
1: Generate an initial population of s× l random samples
2: Filter the population by a threshold vector to form s binary samples
3: Compute CSi from every sample si of the population
4: Compute and rank fitness v(CSi) of every sample si
5: Get best v(CSi), let v∗(CS)=v(CSi) and CS∗ = CSi
6: repeat
7: Select s/2 pairs of parents by the method mentioned in Subsection 2.3.2
8: Proceed Crossover and Mutation according to Subsection 2.3.2
9: Breed a new generation of population from the process above.
10: Compute CSi from every sample si of the new population
11: Compute and rank fitness v(CSi) of every sample si
12: Get best v(CSi), let v′(CS) = v(CSi) and CS′ = CSi
13: IF v′(CS) > v∗(CS), update CS∗ = CS′ and v∗(CS) = v′(CS)
14: until termination condition has been met
15: Output v∗(CS) and CS∗
Example 4.1 Crossover and Mutation
(a) Crossover:
Suppose we have two samples with 6 digits of code, say S1 and S2. Let's randomly choose
3 to be a xed crossover point; then the new sample S ′1 will keep the rst 3 digits of S1
and substitutes the rest with S2, and S
′
2 as well. The process is shown in Figure 2.4 (a).
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(b) Mutation:
Let S be the chosen sample with 6 digits of code for mutation. Again, if we randomly
pick 3 as a mutation point, which value is 0, the new sample after mutation will be 1, as
shown in Figure 2.4 (b).
Example 4.2 Demonstration of the rst iteration of GA with the connection encoding
To simplify the demonstration, let us assume a graph of n=4 nodes (i.e. agents). For
easy explanation, the connection index mapping of the four agents is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: The vector represents the connections of the four agents.
While considering all possible connections, from the figure we know that the to-
tal number of connections is given by l=(n− 1) + ...+ 1=n(n−1)/2 = 4(4−1)/2 = 6.
Therefore, l is the element length of a sample, and represents any candidate gene’s
binary vector in a GA population. Hence, in this example, a single sample vector,
denoted by si, will have a length of six binary bits, such that si=[c12, c13, c14, c23, c24, c34],
where cij denotes the connection condition, thus cij =“1” or “0”, and represents
whether any two agents ai and aj are connected or not accordingly.
Furthermore, let P =[p1, ..., pl], 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1, denote the probability vector for any
two agents being connected, which is generally called the “threshold”. In advance,
let m denote the given number of samples to represent the size of the population,
and let S denote the population matrix which has the size of m×l. Thus any si ∈
S, 1≤i≤m, represent the ith row sample which has an l length bits as well.
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In the GA computation, we need to obtainm samples with an l binary length to
represent the first generation of the population. Firstly, let us generate an X=m×l
matrix of random values, such that every element xi,j ∈X , 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1, represents
any jth element in the ith row. Hence, if xi,j ≤ pj , xi,j will be set to 1, otherwise xi,j
will be set to 0. Thus, by comparing every element xi,j in the ith row with pj , we get
the binary vector of the ith row that represents the connection structure of that ith
sample.
For instance, letP =[0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]denote the probability vector. Firstly,
we need to generate four vectors (xi, 1≤i≤4 ) of random numbers as shown in Table
4.1. After each xi vector is compared to the threshold P , we get binary vector of
sample si.
Table 4.1: Random number, binary vector and CS of the Four Samples.
Sample Random Number (xi) Binary Vector (si) CS (Ci)
No. 1 [0.22, 0.87, 0.21, 0.92, 0.49, 0.61] [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0] {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}}
No. 2 [0.77, 0.52, 0.30, 0.19, 0.08, 0.74] [0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0] {{a1, a2, a3, a4}}
No. 3 [0.44, 0.16, 0.88, 0.27, 0.41, 0.30] [1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1] {{a1, a2, a3, a4}}
No. 4 [0.63, 0.58, 0.60, 0.27, 0.28, 0.25] [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1] {{a2, a3, a4}, {a1}}
∗Initial Threshold P 0 = [0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]
Again, from Figure 4.1 and si we get the CS of each Ci. The first, third and fifth
bits (c12 = c14 = c24 = 1) of vector s1 = [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0] mean that there are connec-
tions between (a1, a2), (a1, a4) and (a2, a4). The remaining three bits (=0) show that
there are no connections for the three pairs of agents (a1, a3), (a2, a3) and (a3, a4)
separately. Hence s1 represents the CS of C1 = {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}}. Consequently,
s2, s3 and s4 represent CS of C2=C3= {{a1, a2, a3, a4}} and C4= {{a2, a3, a4}, {a1}}
accordingly. The real connections maps of the four samples are shown in Figure
4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Connections Map of the Four Samples.
From the above initial population and the corresponding fitness values show in
Table 2.3, we get v(C1)=120 + 25=145, v(C2)=v(C3)=140 and v(C4)=115 + 30=
145. By following the GA process, the evolution steps keep iterating from then on.
For example, a second population is generated after the following steps:
• Crossover: Let’s select s1 and s4 for the first pair of parents. Following ex-
ample 4.1, after the crossover, the offspring will be s′1 = [1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1] and
s′2 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]. Their represented CS are C ′1 = {{a1, a2, a3, a4}} and C ′2 =
{{a2, a4}, {a1}, {a3}}, and respectively have the fitness values v(C ′1)=140 and
v(C ′2) = 70 + 30 + 25 = 125. Thus, by selecting the best two randomly, we
keep s1 and s4 to be the new pair after crossover. Again, by repeating the
crossover, let’s select s1 and s2 for the second pair of parents. (Note that, since
the fitness of v(C2) = v(C3) = 140 is lower than others, therefore, they are
less likely to be selected.) After repeating the crossover for the second pair,
we get s′3 = [1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0] and s′4 = [0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0]. Their represented CS are
C ′3 = {{a1, a2, a3, a4}} and C ′4 = {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}}, and each have the fitness
values v(C ′3)=140, and v(C ′4)=120+25=145. Again, by selecting the best two
randomly, we get s1 and s′4 to be the new pair after crossover. Consequently,
the new population, s1, s4, s1, s′4, are created after the two crossover processes.
• Mutation: Following the mutation process mentioned above, let us select s1
to be the chosen sample. After mutation, the new sample s′′1 = [1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]
represents C ′′1 = {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}} and v(C ′′1 ) = 120 + 25 = 145.
As a consequence, we get the new population, [s1, s4, s′′1, s′4], after the first iteration.
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4.2.4 PBIL
For demonstrating the potential ability of our proposed algorithm, the proce-
dure of the original PBIL is described as follows.
Let P denote the probability vector with real values in the range [0, 1] for each
component Pj . P’s length, denoted by l, which is equal to that of the genotype and
is given by Equation 4.3. In PBIL, every component Pj represents the threshold
of gaining a value 1 in the jth component of the genotype. Thus we know that P
= (P1, P2, · · · , Pl).
Initially, the probability vector, denoted by P(0), is simply set with every Pj=0.5.
For each iteration, a s rows by l columns matrix Rwith entries of random numbers
inside [0, 1] is drawn, where s is the size of the population’s samples. Let G de-
note the population matrix, and Gi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ s, represent its ith genotype,
corresponding to a CS. Since P and R are given, every entry Gij in Gi is assigned
as 1 if Rij < Pj ; otherwise, Gij = 0. Let Vi denote the fitness value of Gi, which is
evaluated by Equation 4.2 with Gij given, such that Vi =
∑
Ck∈CS(i) v(Ck).
After that, P (t+1)j is assessed upon the fitness of maximum Vmax and minimum
Vmin with a pair of parameters named learning rate γ and negative learning rate ε,
respectively. Since Vmax and Vmin are obtained from the current step, there are two





(1− γ)P (t)j + γ Ǵj if Ǵj = G̋j ,
(1− γ)P (t)j + ε(Ǵj − P (t)j ) + γ Ǵj if Ǵj 6= G̋j ,
(4.4)
where Ǵ and G̋ represent the vector Gi when Vi = Vmax or Vi = Vmin, respectively.
After successive P(t+1)-updating iterations, the procedure can be stopped by a
given condition. This condition can be a maximum number of iterations has been
reached, or an adequate fitness value has been found from the population. The
pseudocode of PBIL is shown in Algorithm 3.
Example 4.3 Demonstration of steps for PBIL threshold vector updating:
Following Example 4.2, the rst procedure of PBIL is the same as GA until the rst
population is generated. For instance, let P =[0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5] denote the prob-
ability vector. Firstly, we need to generate four vectors (xi, 1≤i≤4) of random numbers as
shown in Table 4.2. After each xi vector is compared to the threshold P , we get binary
vector of sample si as well.
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Algorithm 3 PBIL
1: Initialize probability vector P(0)
2: Set CS∗ = ∅, v∗(CS)= 0
3: repeat
4: Generate a population Gs from P(t)
5: Compute CSi from every sample Gi of the new population
6: Evaluate the fitness Vi of each member Gi for all i ∈ n
7: Find Ǵ, G̋ and update P (t+1)j according to Equation 4.4
8: IF Vmax > v∗(CS), update CS∗ = Ǵ and v∗(CS) = Vmax
9: until termination condition has been met
10: Output v∗(CS) and CS∗
Table 4.2: Random number, binary vector and CS of the Four Samples.
Sample Random Number (xi) Binary Vector (si) CS (Ci)
No. 1 [0.08, 0.78, 0.44, 0.72, 0.98, 0.54] [1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0] {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}}
No. 2 [0.51, 0.07, 0.27, 0.50, 0.68, 0.80] [0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0] {{a1, a2, a3, a4}}
No. 3 [0.38, 0.07, 0.29, 0.91, 0.21, 0.45] [1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1] {{a1, a2, a3, a4}}
No. 4 [0.93, 0.02, 0.60, 0.95, 0.23, 0.55] [0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0] {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}}
∗Initial Threshold P 0 = [0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]
Thus we have s1 representing the CS of C1 = {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}}, likewise s2, s3
and s4 representing CS of C2 = C3 = {{a1, a2, a3, a4}} and C4 = {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}}
accordingly.
From Table 2.3 we get v(C1) = 120 + 25 = 145, v(C2) = v(C3) = 140 and v(C4) =
60 + 70= 130 as well. By following the PBIL process, we select the genotype, s1 =
[1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0], of C1 which has the best fitness to update the probability vector P 0.
Let us set γ=0.02 to be the learning rate for updating the vector and simply define
the equation of updating the new threshold vector (P i+1) by
P i+1 = (1− γ)P i + γs∗, (4.5)
where s∗ represents the sample with best fitness value.
Hence, we can compute the new threshold vector P 1=(1− 0.02)P 0+0.02× s∗=
[0.98×0.5, 0.98×0.5, 0.98×0.5, 0.98×0.5, 0.98×0.5, 0.98×0.5]+0.02×[1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]=
[0.51, 0.49, 0.51, 0.49, 0.49, 0.49]. After that, by following the procedure of Figure 2.6,
PBIL will keep updating the threshold vector and renewing the best result accord-
ing to the best fitness found in the iteration processes.
Finally, assume that the iterations have reached to 250 times, and the new thresh-
old vector becomes P 250 = [0.78, 0.01, 0.87, 0.02, 0.75, 0.02]. For the new P 250, let us
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generate another new set of 4 samples randomly. The result of random numbers
(xi), binary vectors (si) and CS (Ci) are shown in Table 4.3. The connections maps
of the last four samples are shown in Figure 4.3.
Table 4.3: Random number, binary vector and CS of the Four Samples.
Sample Random Number (xi) Binary Vector (si) CS (Ci)
No. 1 [0.68, 0.75, 0.83, 0.85, 0.07, 0.85] [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0] {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}}
No. 2 [0.36, 0.61, 0.30, 0.37, 0.26, 0.56] [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0] {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}}
No. 3 [0.26, 0.74, 0.12, 0.57, 0.94, 0.00] [1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1] {{a1, a2, a3, a4}}
No. 4 [0.54, 0.19, 0.81, 0.98, 0.85, 0.53] [1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0] {{a1, a2, a4}, {a3}}
∗Threshold P 250 = [0.78, 0.01, 0.87, 0.02, 0.75, 0.02]
Figure 4.3: Connections Map of the Four Samples Obtained from PBIL.
During the PBIL optimisation process, the threshold has kept updating in each
iteration as shown in Table 4.4. The result of this simple example reveals that the
P 250 will be much more likely to find the same global solution as the exact solution
of ES.
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Table 4.4: The Threshold of the four samples in some selected Iiterations.
No. of Iteration Threshold Vector (P i)
Initial [0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50]
1 [0.51, 0.49, 0.51, 0.49, 0.49, 0.49]
50 [0.53, 0.36, 0.59, 0.36, 0.56, 0.44]
100 [0.51, 0.17, 0.56, 0.33, 0.70, 0.34]
150 [0.64, 0.07, 0.73, 0.12, 0.77, 0.14]
200 [0.68, 0.03, 0.87, 0.04, 0.75, 0.06]
250 [0.78, 0.01, 0.87, 0.02, 0.75, 0.02]
Further to the original PBIL, there is a variation of PBIL also proposed by Baluja
& Caruana (1995), namely the Top-k PBIL (T-PBIL). The updating process of the
probability vector in T-PBIL includes all the genotypes of the kth highest fitness
rather than considering the best and worst. Thus, the method for updating the new
P (t+1) can be given by
P
(t+1)








where Gm is the m-th genotype sorted by the fitness values. The pseudocode of
T-PBIL is shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 T-PBIL
1: Initialize probability vector P(0)
2: Set CS∗ = ∅, v∗(CS)= 0
3: repeat
4: Generate a population Gs from P(t)
5: Compute CSi from every sample Gi of the new population
6: Evaluate and rank the fitness Vi of each member Gi for all i ∈ n
7: Sort all Gm’s according to their fitness Vm
8: Update P(t+1) according to Equation 4.6
9: IF Vmax > v∗(CS), update CS∗ = Ǵ and v∗(CS) = Vmax
10: until termination condition has been met
11: Output v∗(CS) and CS∗
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4.2.5 Top-kMerit Weighting PBIL (PBIL-MW)
Aswe know from the algorithm of PBIL, the probability vector P(t+1) is updated
depending on whether each pair of elements Gij drawn from Ǵ and G̋ are equal or
not. Hence, only Vmax and Vmin are utilized to choose the two alternative learning
rules for updating P (t+1)i . Further to the T-PBIL approach, the probability vector
P(t+1) is updated by the kth best with equal weighting 1/k. Thus we know that the
fitness values of samples are used only for the selection of genotypes for updating
the probability vector.
Intuitively, we know that the fitness value of a sample represents whether the
sample is closer to the optimal value both in quality and quantity. However, there is
no concern for the quantity of fitness both in the updating computation of Equation
4.4 and 4.6.
For instance, suppose we want to update the vector by the best two samples, s1
and s2. LetG1 andG2 denote their genotype vectors. And let V1 and V2 denote their
fitness values as well. From Equation 4.6 we know that the new P (t+1) is given by
P
(t+1)





(G1 +G2) . (4.7)
Further, let us assume that V1  V2 > 0. However, we know that there is no dif-
ference in Equation 4.7. Therefore, we argue that the fitness values may contribute
towards updatingP(t+1) to improve the approximation of the newprobability vector
to the optimal genotype. Hence, the new P (t+1) can be given by
P
(t+1)





(V1 ×G1 + V2 ×G2) . (4.8)
Therefore, based on the reason above, we propose an adaptive algorithm that
incorporates the aforementioned concept by using a weighted average mechanism,
and works as follows. The initial steps are the same as the original PBIL until every
fitness individual Vi has been computed in the first iteration. Then Vi is ranked, and






, 2 ≤ k ≤ n (4.9)
where V ′i = Vi − Vmin, and k is the number of chosen samples with the highest
fitness values. Now that every wi has been obtained, the probability vector P(t+1) is
given by
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Note that, since every fitness Vi is considered and its weight wi is given accordingly,
there is only one learning rate γ that needs to be chosen in our approach. The pseu-
docode of PBIL-MW is shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 PBIL-MW
1: Initialize probability vector P(0)
2: Set CS∗ = ∅, v∗(CS)= 0
3: repeat
4: Generate a population Gn from P(t)
5: Compute CSi from every sample Gi of the new population
6: Evaluate and rank the fitness Vi of each member Gi for all i ∈ n
7: Obtain wi from Equation 4.9
8: Update P(t+1) according to Equation 4.10
9: IF Vmax > v∗(CS), update CS∗ = Gmax and v∗(CS) = Vmax
10: until termination condition has been met
11: Output v∗(CS) and CS∗
4.2.6 Treatment of Initialisation for Coalition Formation
As described in Subsection 2.3.2, we use the initial probability, i.e. the vector
of a threshold, to filter the elements of each sample. Typically, the value is set to
0.5 in the applications both for GA and PBIL. However, in our genotype encoding
scheme in Subsection 4.2.2, we found that a traditional initial value, i.e. 0.5, is not
preferable.
For instance, let us assume a graph of n=3 nodes (i.e. agents). From Equation
4.3 we know that there are 3×(3−1)
2
= 3 connections among these three agents. Ac-
cording to the three connections, there are 23=8 combinations to represent the con-
nections. These 8 combinations are [1,1,1], [1,1,0], [1,0,1], [0,1,1], [1,0,0], [0,1,0],
[0,0,1], and [0,0,0]. For easy explanation, the mapping of the connection index for
the three agents is shown in Figure 4.4.
Here we can find that there are four out of eight binary vectors which all rep-
resent the grand coalition. As shown in Figure 4.5, these four binary vectors are
[1,1,1], [0,1,1], [1,0,1], and [1,1,0]. For a singleton, there is only one binary vector,
[0,0,0], as shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.4: The vector represents the connections of the four agents.
Figure 4.5: The four vectors represent the connections of grand coalition.
Figure 4.6: The vector represents no connection of all singletons.
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Furthermore, let P (i) denote the initial probability, which is equal to i. For a
given initial probability P (i), let P (i)grand and P (i)singleton denote the probabilities of hav-
ing a grand coalition or all singletons separately. Suppose the initial probability
is set to P (0.5), which means that there is 50% chance of a binary code to be 1 or
0. Therefore, the probability of having any vector [C12, C13, C23|Cij = 1 or 0] is
0.53 = 0.125. Since we know that there are four vectors which represent the grand
coalition, therefore, we can find that there is P (0.5)grand = 0.53 × 4 = 0.5 chance of
obtaining a vector to represent a grand coalition. Further to above, we know that
there is one vector, [0,0,0] to represent the singleton, and the probability of having
a singleton is P (0.5)singleton = 0.53 = 0.125.
Moreover, let us set the initial probability to P (0.3). Thuswe know that there 30%
or 70% to have a binary code to be 1 or 0 accordingly. Therefore, the probability to
have a vector [1,1,1] is 0.33 = 0.027. The probability to have a vector [0,1,1], [1,0,1],
and [1,1,0] is all equal to 0.32 × 0.7 = 0.063. Thus we know that there is P (0.7)grand =
0.027 + 0.063 × 3 = 0.216 chance to obtain a vector to represent a grand coalition.
Again, there is one vector, [0,0,0] to represent the singleton, and the probability to
have a singleton is P (0.7)singleton = 0.73 = 0.343.
Subsequently, we have summarised the attributes and probabilities of different
initial probabilities for several agents in Table 4.5. It is clear from the table that an
initial probability of P (0.5) will make the binary vector more likely to represent a
grand coalition in the connection scheme. For example, from Table 1, we know that
P
(0.5)
grand ≈ 0.937 for an alliance of 8 agents. The extremely higher probability will lead
the searching process away from the smaller subset. Therefore we know that P (0.5)
is not a good value for stochastic optimisation methods.
Therefore, to make the stochastic optimisation algorithms work for the coalition
formation problem, we have proposed an essential treatment for giving the initial
probability of the coalition formation as described below.
Assume a graph of n nodes. We consider all possible connections, and fullmesh:
N= n(n− 1)/2, which is the length of gene probability vector in stochastic optimi-
sation methods. Suppose for each of theN-connections the probability for its being
“ 1” (connected) is p. π(0) is the probability of having all singletons:
The probability of having m connections is
πm = CNm (1− p)mpN−m (4.11)
which gives a binomial distribution.
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Table 4.5: The attributes and probabilities for different initial probabilities and agents.
No. of agents 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No. of connections 1 3 6 10 15 21 28
Total combinations 2 8 64 1024 32768 2097152 268435456
No. of grand coalitions 1 4 38 728 26704 1866256 251548592




grand 0.5 0.5 ≈0.594≈0.711 ≈0.815 ≈0.890 ≈0.937
P
(0.5)




grand 0.3 0.216≈0.219≈0.256 ≈0.317 ≈0.394 ≈0.480
P
(0.3)




grand 0.1 0.028≈0.013≈0.008 ≈0.006 ≈0.006 ≈0.005
P
(0.1)
singleton 0.9 0.729≈0.531≈0.349 ≈0.206 ≈0.109 ≈0.052
∗ P (i) denote the initial probability which is equal to i.
∗∗ P (i)grand denote the probabilities to have a grand coalition.
∗∗∗P (i)singletondenote the probabilities to have all singletons.
Similar to Table 4.5, it can be shown from Equation 4.11 that for a conventional
probability threshold set as 0.5, the probability of having n−1 connections in the
network forming a grand coalition is potentially approaching to 1. Basically, for
applying the stochastic optimisation methods, we wish that the chance to obtain
any size of subset should be as even as possible. Therefore, we set a threshold such
that the mean value of the number of connections is E = (n − 1)/2. Now that the











suggesting 1/n as the threshold for initializing the probability vector.
In short, our suggested threshold, i.e. 1/n, has clearly made the optimisation
process more likely to reach a better solution, as shown in the next section.
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4.3 Experiment
4.3.1 Data
The data we used in this study are composed of two different sources. The first
part is power consumption of smart-meter readings inNewZealand. The other part
is power generated by commercialized facilities of wind turbines and solar panels
which are coupled with New Zealandmeteorological data1. The power status of all
members, i.e. agents of experiment data, is then given by subtracting consumption
from power generated. Eventually, we use the power data (in kWh) on an hourly
basis, and the price Pr = 20 (¢/kWh). Furthermore, we know that once the whole
group has a power surplus at a given hour, then the grand coalition will make a
trivial solution. Thus, we only consider cases with power deficits. Four cases are
shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Power status for 12 agents in 4 case studies.
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12
Case I -0.348 -1.558 -0.074 0.569 0.523 1.122 0.184 0.261 -0.450 -0.376 -0.222 -0.384
Case II -2.020 -0.762 0.082 0.552 0.570 -0.309 -1.435 -0.889 -0.193 0.129 -0.808 2.074
Case III -1.541 -1.084 -0.160 -0.196 0.596 -0.435 -1.611 -1.790 -0.167 0.337 1.791 3.131
Case IV -3.414 -0.774 0.244 0.842 0.844 -1.881 -0.479 -0.901 -1.452 -0.324 0.121 0.287
4.3.2 Results
In our experiments, the cases with a group size of 12 usually will take over 200
seconds to complete the ES computation, while the size growing to 13 the running
time will exponentially increase up to 20 minutes more, which means ES will be-
come unfeasible for a more substantial number of agents. Meanwhile, the running
time of SO algorithms growth nearly linearly with the number of agents. Figure 4.7
shows the running time of the four algorithms in terms of the number of agents.
Furthermore, from assessing the effectiveness of using different k values for top-
k weightings in T-PBIL and PBIL-MW, the result is shown in Figure 4.8. The k value
for each algorithm is appended after the algorithm name, e.g., PBIL-MW-2 denotes
PBIL-MW with top 2 for weighted averaging. From the figure, it is clear that all
1Meteorological data obtained from NIWA’s National Climate Database
(https://cliflo.niwa.co.nz/ (accessed: 31/Dec/2019)).
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Figure 4.7: Execution time of different agent sizes
k values manage to achieve the global optimum within about 120 iterations. Al-
though the converging speeds differ with various k values been used, PBIL-MW
seems to converge faster than T-PBIL.
As the discussion in Subsection 4.2.6, the initial probability for SO may influ-
ence the converging speed. Therefore, we use PBIL-MW-10with some probabilities
to demonstrate the results of different initial probabilities, as shown in Figure 4.9.
From the Figure, all the PBIL variants reach to the global optimum, and PBIL-MW-
10 has the fastest converging speed.
Besides the initial probability, (Liu et al., 2016) mention that for BPSO, a smaller
inertia weight enhances the exploration capability while a higher inertia weight
encourages exploitation. Thus, we have compared the different inertia for BPSO,
as shown in Figure 4.10. From the Figure, w=0.9 is the best that has the fastest
converging speed and is the only one that hits the global optimum.
Furthermore, for comparing the different SO algorithms, we have used the same
initial probability p=1/12 for all the SO algorithm. In addition to BPSO, the inertia
w=0.9 is selected. The results are shown in Figure 4.11. From the Figure, PBIL-
MW-10, PBIL-MW-2 and BPSO all hit the global optimum. Among the three, PBIL-
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Figure 4.8: Comparisons of optimums and convergent speeds among different top-k
weights of PBIL-MW for initial probability=(1/n)=(1/12)≈ 0.083.
MW-10 has the fastest converging speed, and BPSO is a bit slower than the other
two.
Hereafter, a four-case study in terms of PBIL-MW, PBIL and GA are carried out.
For simplicity, the experiments use all particles in merit weighting for PBIL-MW.
Figure 4.12 is an example of optimized connections and profits found for samples
in Case I.
After using ES to obtain the ground-truths of the four cases, the three algo-
rithms, which using various initial probability threshold settings, are testing and
comparing with the ground-truth. In order to address the potentiality of gaining
the optimal structure by heuristic algorithms, a size of 100 populations, amaximum
of 200 iterations and 4 initial probabilities p, (=0.5, 0.1, 1/n≈ 0.083, 0.05), are given
to a 12-agents coalition game as the standard setup in the experiment. For con-
sidering all possible connections, therefore, let l denote a full mesh of all agents’
connections, (l = 12 × (12 − 1)/2 = 66), which has been given as the length of
gene’s probability vector for all three algorithms. Each of the three approaches is
examining with six given initial probabilities and 20 runs for the four cases.
The implementation of GA follows the standard operation procedure of Mars-
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Figure 4.9: Comparisons of optimums and convergent speeds of PBIL-MW-10 among dif-
ferent initial probabilities (P)
land (2015). The parameters usedhere aremutation-probability=1/l, crossover=uniform.
The implementation of BPSO follows the procedure of Liu et al. (2016). The param-
eters used here are: w=0.9, C1 = C2 = 2.
For PBIL, γ = 0.1, ε = 0.075, mutation-probability= 0.02 and mutation-shift=
0.05 are used. While for PBIL-MW, only one parameter γ = 0.05 is used.
Table 4.7 is a statistical summary which shows the values of mean, variance and
p-value of results obtained by different methods. To give the p-value of a student
t-test in hypothesis testing (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016), the significance level α is
set to 0.05 and the result of PBIL-MW with p = 1/n is chosen to be the principal
sample while the test was performed. Therefore, if the calculated p-value is be-
low the threshold α chosen for statistical significance (i.e. 0.05), then the result is
significantly different from the result of principal sample.
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Figure 4.10: Comparisons of optimums and convergent speeds of PSO among different
inertia.





















Figure 4.11: Comparisons of optimums and convergent speeds among PBIL-original,













































Figure 4.12: Different connections and profits found in terms of PBIL-MW, PBIL and GA.
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By comparing the results obtained by the same methods in Table 4.7, it is clear
that our suggestion p = 1/n consistently leads to the best outcome, regardless the
algorithm is PBIL, PBIL variants, GA or BPSO.
Moreover, by comparing the probabilities given in the experiment, it is easy to
know that p=1/n is apparent a better choice for the initial probability while search-
ing for the optimal CS. Hence, the result proves that the suggestion of initializing
probability by 1/n is a reasonable and effective strategy.
Furthermore, the result of the SO algorithms with p = 1/n shows in Figure
4.13 to 4.16 suggests that although GA can find a better local optimum at the first
few iterations, it is trapped there for the rest of the iterations. BPSO works fine in
Case I but not as good in the others. The same as the PBIL, which can get a better
local optimum than PBIL-MW initially, but again, it is restricted. Even though the
converging speed of PBIL-MW is the least, it has a better diversity which helps to
find the global optimum of fitness.
The time consumed for experiments2 of the three algorithms is similar and ap-
proximate to 6 sec, which is faster than ES.





















Figure 4.13: Optima and converging speeds of the algorithms for Case I.
2The code of the experiments is written, and testing in Python 3.6 on Windows 7 PC with Intel
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Figure 4.14: Optima and converging speeds of the algorithms for Case II.



















Figure 4.15: Optima and converging speeds of the algorithms for Case III.
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Figure 4.16: Optima and converging speeds of the algorithms for Case IV.
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a novel heuristic PBIL-MW algorithm and a strategy
for choosing the initial probability for solving a coalition game of agents in partition
form.
The recommended approach, which is based on SO algorithms, distributes par-
ticipated agents to collaborate and act upon coalitions, to obtain the maximum
profit hourly, and therefore could bring considerable payoff for members within
a group in the long-term.
Furthermore, the proposed constraint by limiting the agents to form net power-
surplus coalitions, one can secure the power distribution network from fluctuated
demand and supply. Meanwhile, the scheme of the approach could enable a de-
centralised power system and improve the penetration of renewable energy.
We have shown the potential of PBIL-MW in solving the problem of CSG, such
that a large number of agents in a group can form various feasible coalitions with
an optimisation solution found within a limited time. The solution reveals here is a
primary objective in the research of CSG. This result shows that PBIL-MW outper-
forms the PBIL and GA when searching for the optimal solution.
For future work, we will improve the PBIL-based algorithm based on some new
coalition schemes and compare them with more SO methods by using larger-scale
agents in the next two chapters.
Chapter 5
Improved CSG using Set-ID coding
Following on the previous chapter, to expend the number of agents in a CSG
problem, this chapter proposes a new genotype encoding scheme, namely Set-ID
coding, which has shortened the binary length of the sample. As a result, the new
scheme has improved the performance of SO algorithms. Besides, for coping with
the more large number of agents, this chapter has introduced a DP algorithm to
substitute the ES in order to obtain exact solutions to compare the results with other
SO algorithms used in this chapter.
The proposed algorithmhas been examined by four sizes of agents set, including
12, 13, 16 and 20 agents, and each size has four sets for experiments. All of the
agents are randomly picked from the database obtained in Chapter 3. The results
demonstrate notable performance enhancements over the existing state-of-the-art
methods. The approach and experiment in this chapter are extensions of one of our
previous papers (Lee et al., 2018a).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.3, firstly, we review
the connection scheme in previous chapter, and show the disadvantage of connec-
tion scheme for the SOmethods. Then, we propose a new Set-ID encoding scheme.
Furthermore, a comparison of the two as been discussed. In Section 5.4, to find the
best initial probability suits for the Set-ID scheme, we have examined several ini-
tial values with respect to all the SO methods in this Chapter. Some results of the
experiment are shown in Section 5.5, with the algorithm’s performance, compared
with DP, PBIL and GA in terms of convergence speed and computational efficiency
for regional-scale optimisation. In the end, we conclude this chapter and point to
some possible further directions.
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5.1 Coalition Model in Local Smart Grids
In this chapter, we continue to use the scenario of local coalitions, as shown in
Subsection 3.3.1 and Figure 3.1. However, in order to explore the feasibility and
potential advantages of SO algorithms to solve the CSG, we will enlarge the scale
from 12 agents to 20 agents in incremental steps.
Similar to Chapter 4, we assume that the prosumer agents are located within
a distribution grid, e.g. a town or district, which could directly provide power-
sharing through the distribution network.
5.2 Algorithmic Solutions
5.2.1 Deterministic Direct Search Algorithms
As we know from Chapter 4, the ES is an extreme low-efficiency algorithm be-
cause it directly searches the entire CSG space. Again, we have shown its limitation
in the experiment in Section 5.5. Therefore, we have used the DP algorithm in this
chapter to obtain the optimum solution to compare its accuracy and efficiency with
the SO algorithms. The detailed procedure for using DP to solve the CSG problem
has been shown in Subsection 2.3.1.
5.2.2 Stochastic Optimization (SO) methods
The SO algorithms we use in this chapter are the same as those in Chapter 4,
which are GA, BPSO, PBIL and PBIL-MW. However, to improve efficiency, we have
introduced a new scheme, named Set-ID, whichwill be demonstrated in the follow-
ing Section.
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5.3 Set-ID Encoding Scheme for SO Algorithms
The algorithms of SO used in this chapter are GA, BPSO, PBIL and PBIL-MW.
To incorporate SO algorithms for a CSG problem, this chapter proposes a new en-
coding scheme for giving the initial probability of population which is described
below.
In the previous Chapter 4, we proposed a connection scheme of binary encoding
to represent the connection status among agents as a probability vector. Further-
more, we have shown that for a conventional probability threshold set as 0.5, the
possibility of having n−1 connections in the network to form a grand coalition is
potentially very imaginable. To avert this, we suggest 1/n as the threshold for ini-
tializing the probability vector.
The shortcoming of connection encoding is its vector length is a quadratic func-
tion, n(n − 1)/2. Hence, when the number of agents becomes larger, the length of
the probability vector will overgrow. Therefore, this chapter proposes a novel en-
coding scheme by using the coalition ID to allocate agents into different groups in
the process of searching for an optimal coalition structure.
For example, in an 8 agents scenario, the bit-length is dlog2 8e = 3, the binary
vector [0, 0, 0] represents the no. 0 set, and [0, 0, 1] represents no. 1 etc. Hence, if the
ID array for agents 1 to 8 is [3, 2, 3, 7, 2, 2, 4, 0] then the coalitions will be
Coalition 0: {a8};
Coalition 2: {a2, a5, a6};
Coalition 3: {a1, a3};
Coalition 4: {a7};
Coalition 7: {a4}.
Therefore, the CS for this ID set is
{{a1, a3}, {a2, a5, a6}, {a4}, {a7}, {a8}}.
Consequently, agents with the same ID suggest that they are in the same coali-
tion. For a set of n agents, the maximum coalition is n (all singletons), and the
minimum coalition is 1 (the grand coalition). Therefore, n×m bits (m = dlog2 ne)
will be a sufficient length for the probability vector to represent all possible coali-
tion structures. According to the Set-ID vector, any agent in the set can be indexed
by any ID number withinm bits. Therefore, the scheme also could provide a more
effective and flexible for matching various CS which reveals the formalisation of
CSG in terms of the number of CS and the number of total subsets as described in
Section 2.2.
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Figure 5.1 shows the Probability vector length of connect and set-id schemes.
From the figure, we can see that when the number of agents growing to large size,
the vector length of connection becoming a huge bit. Alternatively, the vector length
of Set-ID scheme grows much lower. For instance, for 80 agents the vector length
grows to 3160 bits, and the length Set-ID only grows to 560 bits, which is only 18%
of the vector length of the connection scheme. Therefore, the Set-ID will consume
less computer’s memory and run faster, as demonstrated in Figure 5.3 in Section
5.5. Furthermore, since the Set-ID scheme demands less memory which will allow
a more large size of the agent still be feasible, as described in Chapter 6.























Figure 5.1: Probability vector length of connect and set-id schemes.
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5.4 Initial Probability Threshold for Set-ID Encoding
According to our Set-ID scheme, we have found that an initial threshold of 0.5
will make the algorithms’ iterations tend to choose coalition structures with a com-
bination of smaller grouping sizes as coalitions, which lead to much longer itera-
tions to find a better solution. Therefore, we have examined a series of initial proba-
bilities from 0.5 to 0.05 with a 0.05 interval. The results suggested that a 0.1 thresh-
old is the best initial value for 20-agent cases, which have led to optimal or good
solutions with fewer iterations. Consequently, it is reasonable that we set a thresh-
old away from 0.5 so that the |Ck| (the size of coalition Ck) will formmany versatile
coalition structures. Figure 5.2 shows the different converging speed concerning
different thresholds. In the figure, it is clear that both 0.1 and 0.9 are better than
others.
























Figure 5.2: the different converging speed concerning different thresholds
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5.5 Experiment
5.5.1 Setup
Aiming potential application in real-world smart grids, we follow our prior re-
search to construct a realistic dataset, which are composed of two different sources.
The first part is power consumption of smart-meter readings in New Zealand. The
other part is power generated by commercialized facilities of wind turbines and
solar panels which are coupled with meteorological data of New Zealand1. The
power conditions of all agents are then given by subtracting demand from supply.
The power(kWh) used are on an hourly basis, and the price Pr = 20 (¢/kWh).
Moreover, we know that once the union has a power surplus at a given hour then
the grand coalition will make a trivial solution. Thus, we consider only cases with
overall power deficits. In our data, we have one year of hourly power demand and
supply for 240 agents. Among those, four cases with power deficits are randomly
chosen. The statistics of these four cases are shown in Table 5.1. The detail process
of generating the dataset is described in Subsection 3.4.3.
Table 5.1: Statistics of Power status for 20 agents in 4 cases.
Case Sno Surplus Mean-Sno Dno Deficit Mean-Dno
I 7 5.394 0.771 13 -12.741 -0.980
II 5 2.659 0.532 15 -7.948 -0.530
III 10 4.646 0.465 10 -10.87 -1.087
IV 10 5.024 0.502 10 -7.663 -0.766
Sno: No. of agents with Surplus power, Dno: No. of agents with Deficit power.
5.5.2 Results
Todemonstrate the out-performance of Set-ID Scheme in PBIL-MW,we compare
its efficiency and accuracy with different approaches.
Effectiveness
In this comparison, as shown in Table 5.2, there are seven approaches which
are ES, DP, PBIL-MWwith the connection scheme (Lee et al., 2017), BPSO, GA, and
PBIL-MWwith the Set-ID scheme. The number of agents in the experiments are 12,
1Meteorological data obtained from NIWA’s National Climate Database
(https://cliflo.niwa.co.nz/ (accessed: 31/Dec/2019)).
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13, 16, 20, respectively. For SO-based algorithms, the population size and number
of iterations used are 200 and 500 accordingly.
From Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3, it is evident that a group size of 12 takes over 200
sec to complete the ES, while for 16-agents the time required increases up to more
than 140 hours, which becomes impractical for larger smart grids.
Even though DP runs faster than ES, however, DP still needs over 2.8 hours to
reach an exact solution for a 20-agents case, which also becomes impractical in a
large number of agents.
In this test, we use one connection encoding scheme for PBIL-MW. It is clear
that this approach is much faster than DP, but when comparing it with the Set-ID
scheme, it may consume more memory and take longer while the size becomes
more significant.
Table 5.2: Average Time needed by different approaches.
Number of Agents 12 13 16 20Methods
ES 207.1 1,215.3 504,125.2 na
DP 8.7 65.3 136.5 22,367.7
PBIL-MW(C) 6.2 12.4 30.2 44.6
BPSO(ID) 21.9 24.7 29.4 43.5
GA(ID) 7.5 10.2 13.5 30.6
PBIL(ID) 5.3 6.5 9.6 19.2
PBIL-MW(ID) 5.1 6.3 9.7 19.2
-The best results are highlighted in bold. Unit: sec
* (C) indicates the connection scheme, (ID) indicate the SET-ID scheme.
Table 5.3 shows the average best results by different approaches compared to
DP. From the Table, it is clear that PBIL-MW(ID) has the best result. For Case I,
II, and IV, each case has run 20 times, and all reached the optimum get by DP. For
Case III, there are 80% (16 in 20) still reached to the optimum, as shown in Table 5.4.
Furthermore, if we increase the number of iterations to 2000, as shown in Figure 5.4,
it is clear that after over 500 iterations, all the 20 runs reached to the optimum.
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Figure 5.3: Execution time of different agent sizes




















Figure 5.4: Comparative results of PBIL-MW for Case-III after 2000 iterations
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Table 5.3: Average best results by different approaches compared to DP.
Case DP PBIL-MW(ID) PBIL-(ID) GA PBIL-MW(C)
I 53.16 53.16 53.16 51.8 53.16
II 92.86 92.86 92.86 81.79 92.85
III 100.34 100.3 100.29 87.192 99.9
IV 107.86 107.86 107.86 100.79 107.85
-The best results are highlighted in bold. Unit: ¢
Table 5.4: Average iterations which hit the ground-truth.
Case PBIL-MW(ID) PBIL-(ID) GA PBIL-MW(C)
I 98 115 na 171
II 196 184 na 345(85%)*
III 228(80%)* 276(80%)* na Na
IV 159 186 na 283(90%)*
-The best results are highlighted in bold.
* Average Iterations for the Percentage, denotes by (%), of 20 runs
which hit the ground-truth.
Accuracy
AlthoughDP takesmore time to obtain the result, it is still an essential approach
because it guarantees to reach the global optimum. In comparison with other al-
gorithms, we choose 4 cases of 20 agents run by DP to be our ground-truth. The
accuracy in terms of SO-based algorithms is described below separately.
For an extensive feasible study of the application of GA to CSG, we use three
crossover parameters (single-point, uniform and segment), four mutation proba-
bilities (0.05, 0.08, 0.1, 0.2), 200 samples, 500 iterations, 20 runs and three initial
probabilities (0.1, 1/n (=1/20) and 0.03). Among these, we found the best one is
with these parameters: segment crossover, mutation = 0.03, and initial probability
= 0.05.
Similar to the GA study, PBIL and PBIL-MW are run by the same parameters
of population, iterations and runs. Besides this, there are only three parameters
(number of top-best, learning rate and initial probability) that need to be assigned
for both approaches. To summarise the best results, we have fixed the number of
top-best at 2, and the learning rate at 0.005. The initial probability used in the Con-
nection scheme is 1/N (=0.05) and 0.1 for the Set-ID scheme.
Figure 5.5 to 5.8 present the results of the four cases, where (ID) and (C) in the
legend denote the schemes of Set-ID and Connection accordingly.
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From the four figures, we can see that PBIL-MW(ID) outperforms all others
both in converging speed and accuracy. For the Cases of I, II and IV, the optima of
these cases hit the ground-truth with fewer iterations. Except for Case III, the mean
of best fitness for the 20 runs is 100.32, which is slightly less than the ground-truth
which is 100.34. Among those 20 runs, there are 17 experiments whose best results
meet the optimum. Therefore, we can say that the accuracy to find the exact CS is
85% in this case. However, we also tried to increase the number of iterations to 1000
for case III and found that the PBIL-MW(ID) always reached the optimum for all
20 runs. The average iterations for new experiments to hit the ground-truth are 238,
and the shortest and longest iterations are 82 and 512 respectively.
Furthermore, we also use a measurement, called Solution Quality (Michalak
et al., 2016), to examine the “current” best solution found at a given time while
running an optimisation. The solution quality is given by v(cs)/v(cs∗), where v(cs)
and v(cs∗) denote the current and the optimal solution respectively. The results are
shown in Table 5.4. The quality solution for the PBIL-MW(ID) scheme after over
500 iterations all the four cases reached to the optimum. As a result, PBIL-MW(ID)
has shown its superiority among the SO we used.
In general, our experiment results show that PBIL-MW(ID) is a fast and reliable
approach for solving the CSG problem in smart grids.

















Figure 5.5: Comparative results of PBIL-MW for Case-I
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Figure 5.6: Comparative results of PBIL-MW for Case-II




















Figure 5.7: Comparative results of PBIL-MW for Case-III
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Figure 5.8: Comparative results of PBIL-MW for Case-IV
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5.6 Summary
In this chapterweprove that the newSet-ID outperform the previous connection
scheme both in shortening running time and less PC memory consumption. For a
large number of agents, the ES will become unfeasible2. However, our proposed
newPBIL-MWalgorithm could obtain the nearly exact solutions as the DSmethods
and outperform other DS in efficiency and accuracy.
When the number of agents reaches to 20, there are 51.72 trillion CS need to be
evaluated. Even using the state-of-the-art DS methods, namely the DP approach,
will take over 2.8 hours to find the exact solution on average. However, the ordi-
nary running time of the previous PBIL-MWwith connection scheme is around 45
seconds. Moreover, the new Set-ID approach of PBIL-MW is the fast one, which is
exceeding two times faster than the connection scheme.
Our results have brought evidence to prove that once the appropriate popula-
tion size and the number of iterations have been adequately set up, the optimum
will be reachable by the new algorithm. The faster response of the new approach
meets the requirement of intermittent power exchange for smart grids operating in
a co-operative mode, which can enable a decentralised power system and improve
the penetration of renewable energy.
According to the quick timing of our new approach, the coalitional structure
model can be applied in the off-grid (island) mode. Also, the model can be pro-
vided to a local area for power-sharing at emergence while the power supply is
unavailable, which may be caused by natural hazard or improper operation.
However, this study is aimed at agents of the local smart grid without power
transmission via the transformer. Hence, the consideration of power loss has been
neglected. In the next chapter, we will advance the study to multi-regional appli-
cations with scenarios of more agents and long-distance power-sharing, which will
be taking into account the power loss on transmission lines.
2From the experiment in Section 5.5, we know that a size of 12 agents has spent over 200 sec to
complete the ES, andwhile the size expends to 16-agent the time required increases up to more than
140 hours, which makes ES becoming impractical for larger smart grids.
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Chapter 6
Hierarchical solutions for a large-scale
CSG
Upon the previous two chapters, for enlarging the CSG problem into a multi-
regional area, this chapter proposes theGlobal PBIL-MWand theHierarchical PBIL-
MW approaches, which bring the power loss caused by transformers into account
and enable the problem to be solvedmore efficiently. What ismore, theHierarchical
PBIL-MW approaches improves the performance of Global PBIL-MW algorithms,
while it only causes aminor lower accuracy in comparisonwith the latter approach.
The proposed algorithm has been examined by five sizes of agents set, including
20, 32, 48, 64 and 80 agents, and each size has four sets for experiments. All of the
agents are randomly picked from the database obtained in Chapter 3. The results
demonstrate that these two algorithms can overcome the limitation of the state-
of-the-art DS methods in agents’ number. The approach and experiments in this
chapter are extensions of one of our previous papers (Lee et al., 2018b).
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6.1 Related work
In Chapter 4 we have suggested an improved algorithm, namely Top-k Merit
Weighting PBIL (PBIL-MW) (Lee et al., 2017), for solvingCSGproblems. The result
has shown a promising ability, both in accuracy and efficiency in comparison with
other algorithms. Advancing upon the previous approach, Chapter 5 designs a
new genotype encoding scheme (Lee et al., 2018a), and the new results outperform
a few SO counterparts, such as Genetic Algorithm and the original PBIL. Moreover,
in comparisonwithDP, our approach has largely reduced thememory consumed in
computation and shortened the running time significantly. In this study, we further
proposed two approaches, a Hierarchical PBIL-MW algorithm and a termination
scheme, and both have shown greater advantages for dealing with large scale CSG
applications which the DP variants hardly achieve.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: In Section 6.2, we first give struc-
ture of CoalitionModel for Large Scale Smart Grids. In Section 6.4, we then propose
our SO-based solutions, especially the hierarchical approach and the termination
scheme, for investigating the optimal partition. Some results from the experiment
are shown in Section 6.5, with the algorithm’s performance compared to the DP
and our previous PBIL-MW method in terms of convergence speed and computa-
tional efficiency for more considerable scale optimisation. Finally, we conclude the
chapter and point to some possible further directions.
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6.2 Coalition Model for Large Scale Smart Grids
6.2.1 Coalition Model for Smart Grids
In comparison with other approaches for CSG in smart grids, we adopt the pre-
viousmodel (Lee et al., 2017; 2018a)which requires that every agent in the coalition
should have adequate RE to support its own demand in general. However, accord-
ing to the intermittency of RE, the agent may frequently face a shortage. Accord-
ingly, keeping an agreement to share the surplus energy among others is a more ef-
fective method in comparison to measures such as expanding the facility, installing
a larger backup capacity or dealing with power companies. Since the demand and
supply are both dynamic, the model needs to continuously engage a flexible mech-
anism to obtain the optimal CS. In the studies, we assume all agents exchange their
power generation surplus and their consumption demands regularly, e.g. on an
hourly basis in this study. Thus, a faster algorithm, e.g. within 10 minutes, with ac-
ceptable accuracy will be an essential prerequisite for providing decision-makers,
such as agents or the coalition organizer, with sufficient time to allow agents to ad-
just their power demand and supply, and to reach a confirmed agreement among
the agents.
6.2.2 Distributed Agents in Regional Smart Grids
Based on our previous studies which focused on local coalition, to demonstrate
the ability on a large regional scale, such as cities, we have extended the local model
to four regional areas as shown in Figure 3.2. The power transports among the inter-
area need to be sent by a high voltage transmission network by way of transformers
to exchange power between distribution and transmission lines. The power loss
caused by the electrical lines is trivial in a short distance; therefore, for a simplified
coalition model, only the power losses of transformers, β=2%, per step up or down
via a transformer, are calculated.
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6.3 Algorithmic Solutions
6.3.1 Deterministic Direct Search Algorithms
Aswe know fromChapter 5, the DS algorithm has reached its limitation to solve
a CSG problem with 20 agents. Therefore, as shown in the experiment in Section
6.5, the DP will not be used to obtain the optimum solution when the number of
agents is more than 20.
6.3.2 Stochastic Optimization (SO) methods
From the results in the previous two chapters, we know that our proposed PBIL-
MW algorithm outperforms the other SO Algorithms. Furthermore, as mentioned
in Section 6.2, we have extended the model to four regional areas in this chapter.
Therefore, we have skipped the SO algorithms in the previous chapters, and pro-
pose two improved algorithms of the PBIL-MW.
6.3.3 Set-ID Encoding Scheme for SO Algorithms
To incorporate SO algorithms for a CSG problem, we adopt the Set-Id encoding
scheme as mentioned in Section 5.3.
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6.4 PBIL-MWApproaches for Solving aLarge-ScaleCSG
6.4.1 Global PBIL-MW
Todistinguish the organisational paradigmsused in this study,wename “Global
PBIL-MW” as the approach to search the optimal CSG in a single PBIL-MW com-
putation as in previous studies (Lee et al., 2017; 2018a).
Coalition Evaluation
Following Eq. 4.2, the net powerQ(Ck) of coalition Ck with respect to intra-area
and inter-area are calculated separately. For example, a1 and b1 are surplus agents
in different areas, and a2 is a deficit in the same area as a1. For Coalition {a1, a2}
the net power Q(Ck) = Q(a1) − Q(a2), and for Coalition {b1, a2} the net power
Q(Ck) = Q(b1)× (1− 2β)−Q(a2) = Q(b1)× (1− 4%)−Q(a2).
Initial Probability Threshold
During our preliminary study, we found that different initial thresholds for nu-
merous agents and their power statuses will lead the algorithms’ iterations to find a
better solution at different speeds. Some results are shown in Figure 6.1. Therefore,
we have examined a series of initial probabilities from 0.5 to 0.01, the suggested
initial thresholds for numerous agent size are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Different initial probabilities used in Global PBIL-MW
Period I II III IV
Agent’s size Initial probability
20 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
32 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
48 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
64 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
80 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.1
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Figure 6.1: Comparative results of different initial probabilities for period II
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6.4.2 Hierarchical PBIL-MW
Once the number of agents becomes larger, the sizeF(CS)will be very large. For
instance, in the 80 agents experiment, CS80 = B(80) ≈ 9.913 × 1086, any program
written to implement DP variants might be unfeasible. Although the vector length
L = 80×dlog2 80e = 560 bits will be moderate for PBIL-MW to search for the better
CS, it will consume longer iterations to reach a global or local optimal solution, e.g.
over 27 minutes and 1580 iterations on average will be needed in our experiment.
Consequently, we propose a hierarchical structure of PBIL-MW to accelerate the
process of exploring the CS.
Our hierarchical approachuses two steps of PBIL-MWiterations. First, it searches
every local area separately to form a local optimal CS. Note that, since there is
no transformer within the local area, the power losses are ignored. Secondly, we
then employ all the local coalitions to explore the CS for the whole region. For in-
stance, in the first step, a1 to a4 and b1 to b4 can form a local optimal CS such as
la1 = {a1, a2}, la2 = {a3, a4}, lb1 = {b1, b3} and lb2 = {b2, b4}. According to the
local CS, the second PBIL-MW can look for the hierarchical optimal CS, such as
h1 = {la1, lb2} = {a1, a2, b2, b4} and h2 = {la2, lb1} = {a3, a4, b1, b3}.
From the framework, we realize that after forming the local coalitions, then any
agent in a local coalition would only be able to cooperate with other agents in a
different local coalition by joining the two coalitions. Consequently, the best fitness
will be less than or equal to the one by global PBIL-MW. However, by sacrificing
the accuracy, this approach may shorten the time in return.
6.4.3 Termination Scheme
In the experiments of SO algorithms, the number of iterations and the termina-
tion conditions have to be predefined; otherwise, some program will keep running
endlessly. The termination conditions could be the one or a combination of the
following options:
• A cut-off criterion or condition.
• A fixed iteration number.
• A fixed running time.
• A fixed repeating condition.
As seen in Figure 6.2, we might find that some PBIL-MW can reach a maximum
fitness with just a few iterations. For speeding up the running time, we have im-
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proved the algorithm by adding a threshold check to count the latest best repeating
times during the iterations. Throughout the process, any latest global best fitness
values and repeat times have been recorded. If a further new global best value is
found, then the repeat time will return to one; otherwise, this duplicated time will
be accumulated until its number meets the termination threshold, e.g. 10 times in
our experiments. On that occasion, the program will be terminated earlier.
























To demonstrate the potentials for our approach to be utilized in real-world smart
grids, we follow the same approach as in our previous works to construct a realistic
dataset, which is composed of two diverse sources. The first part is power con-
sumption of smart-meter readings in New Zealand. The second source is power
generated by commercialized facilities of wind turbines and solar panels which are
coupled with New Zealand meteorological data from NIWA1.
To assess the ability of sharing power in a regional area, the weather data of the
four local cities, Dunedin, Balclutha, Middlemarch and Ranfurly, have been gath-
ered from NIWA. The first two cities are located in a windy coastal zone, and the
others are in sunny central Otago. The distance between cities is approximately 40
to 80 km. The power conditions of all agents are then given by subtracting demand
from supply. The power(kWh) used is on an hourly basis, and the price Pr = 20
(¢/kWh).
However, we know that while the union has a net power surplus at some given
hours, then the grand coalition will have trivial solutions. Thus, we consider only
periods with overall power deficits. In our data, we have one year of hourly power
demand and supply for 240 agents. Among those, four hourly periods with net
power deficits are randomly chosen. Furthermore, in comparison with the effi-
ciency of different approaches, we pick five sizes of union at random which are
20, 32, 48, 64 and 80 agents for the all four periods accordingly.
6.5.2 Setup
In our understanding, the algorithms of DS categories are the ones which can
guarantee an exact optimal for CSG (Rahwan et al., 2015). Figure 6.3 shows the DP
running time for four periods with each size from 4, 8, 12, 16 to 20 agents2, and all
the 20 agents’ cases will spend more than 6 hours to get an exact solution.
Our further experiments have utilized 20, 32, 48, 64 and 80 agents for large scale
CSG evaluation, and only the result of 20 agents obtained by DP could be available
as the ground truth in comparison with other algorithms. Accordingly, instead of
DP we will use max-fitness obtained from all approaches in each period to be the
1Meteorological data obtained from NIWA’s National Climate Database
(https://cliflo.niwa.co.nz/ (accessed: 31/Dec/2019)).
2The code of the experiments is written and tested in Python 3.6 on Windows 10 PC with Intel
Core i5-4570 PU and 16 GB memory.
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Figure 6.3: DP with log-scale running time according to different number of agents.
comparison index.
The algorithms used in experiments are Global PBIL-MW (G-PBIL-MW), Hi-
erarchical PBIL-MW (Hi-PBIL-MW) and Hierarchical DP (Hi-DP). For two PBIL-
MW algorithms we also use fixed iteration and a termination scheme for compar-
ison. Consequently, G-PBIL-MW-t and Hi-PBIL-MW-t will represent algorithms
with a termination scheme. Note that DP and Hi-DP are run once, and all PBIL-
MW experiments are repeated 20 times to obtain the average. Figure 6.4 shows
the running time for all PBIL-MW approaches with each size from 20 to 80 agents
accordingly.
6.5.3 Results
Case study of 20 agents
For the four periods, all the algorithms can reach the exact solution as DP’s re-
sults. The optima of these periods are 111.047, 77.889, 98.845, 124.895 respectively.
Table 6.2 shows the time required for each approach. It is clear from the table that
excludes DP, that all others aremore than 200 times faster, and especially they could
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Figure 6.4: PBIL-MW running time according to different number of agents.
Table 6.2: Running time of different approaches for 20 agents
Period DP Hi-DP G-PBIL-MW Hi-PBIL-MW G-PBIL-MW-t Hi-PBIL-MW-t
I 21328.98 16.63 45.05 100.91 14.38 2.11
II 27565.86 14.50 43.94 76.94 36.54 39.91
III 29372.56 0.22 44.75 77.77 17.28 2.70
IV 28605.46 0.22 47.31 81.98 2.77 1.46
Mean 26718.21 7.89 45.26 84.40 17.74 11.54
Unit: sec
all reach the same optima as DP.
Case study from 32 to 80 agents
For the large-scale experiments, we select 32, 48, 64 and 80 agents to be the size
for thewhole four local areas. Hence, from Section 5.3, we know that the bits length
of the probability vector are 160, 288, 384 and 560 accordingly. The population and
number of iterations are consistently 500 and 4000. All PBIL-MW algorithms have
run 20 times, and the results are summarised in Table 6.4. Since DP is unfeasible
in these experiments, we follow the hierarchical structure of PBIL-MW to compute
the fitness of CSG by hierarchical DP (Hi-DP), although it can be executed under 20
agents, while in some cases the local coalitions will exceed 20 which leads to Hi-DP
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Table 6.3: Running time of different approaches for 32 agents
Period Hi-DP G-PBIL-MW Hi-PBIL-MW G-PBIL-MW-t Hi-PBIL-MW-t
I 5608.41 622.88 111.58 171.01 43.68
II 423.81 624.66 101.97 752.01 25.34
III 0.16 676.16 89.33 20.28 2.03
IV 0.10 707.83 87.95 82.15 2.35
Mean 1508.12 657.88 97.71 256.36 18.35
Unit: sec
becoming unfeasible again.
Furthermore, Table 6.3 shows the running time of different approaches for 32
agents. It is obvious from the table that Hi-DP is becoming slower than others.
Thus, we know that Hi-DP will still be unfeasible while the agents’ size becomes
larger.
In general, we find that G-PBIL-MW and G-PBIL-MW-t always have the max-
fitness values, although in some cases the hierarchical approaches will have the
same ones. We have explained in Subsection 6.4.2 that the best values of Hi-PBIL-
MWwill sometimes be less than the global approach. It is clear from Table 6.4 that
even in the worst case, e.g. Period II of 64 agents (as shown in Figure 6.2), its best
fitness is still close to the maximum.
Besides the accuracy, we have computed the average running time of all ap-
proaches as shown in Figure 6.4. The faster converge speed of H-PBIL-t will be an
appropriate alternative, while running time is an essential concern in some appli-
cations. Like the data of our study which are based on an hourly exchange, in the
80 agents’ cases, the G-PBIL-MW or G-PBIL-MW-t will demand nearly half an hour
to obtain the better result, and on the contrary, Hi-PBIL-MW and Hi-PBIL-MW-t
take only 10 minutes less to gain a plausible solution. However, for the large case,
e.g. 200 agents in an hourly-based case, the Hi-PBIL-MW and Hi-PBIL-ME-t could
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6.6 Summary
In this chapter we know that the new Global PBIL-MW and Hierarchical PBIL-
MW demonstrate the superior speed, and a comparable accuracy with other SO
approaches for solving a large scale CSG.The proposed Hierarchical PBIL-MW al-
gorithm could obtain the nearly exact solutions as the Global PBIL-MWwhile out-
performing it in the efficiency.
When the number of agents exceeds in a large number there is no other DS
method could be used to find an exact solution, then both the Global PBIL-MWand
Hierarchical PBIL-MWcould provide a viable alternative. Our results have brought
evidence to confirm that once the appropriate population size and the number of
iterations have been adequately set up, the optimum will be reachable by the new
algorithms. The faster response of the new approaches meet the requirement of
periodic power exchange for smart grids operating in a co-operative mode in an ex-
tensive inter-cities, which can enable the decentralized power systems and improve
the penetration of renewable energy.
In this study, we demonstrate the superior speed and comparable accuracy of hi-
erarchical PBIL-MWapproaches for solving a large scaleCSG.Although the stochas-
tic optimisation algorithms cannot guarantee finding the exact solution, since no
other method could be used, then it could provide a viable alternative.
Renewable energy sharing in a large region is a critical component. Some ar-
eas have abundant wind power, while others have longer sunshine hours. Conse-
quently, the cooperation among those areasmay result in flourishing energy utilisa-
tion and reduce the demand for a backup system. Our study can provide a solution.
While the subsidy of RE is trivial, the prosumer could still be profitable by utilising
the mechanism provided in this study.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
This thesis concerns developing methods to improve the effectiveness and in-
crease the adoption of renewable energy usage. As has been discussed at the outset
of this work, the widespread replacement of fossil-fuel energy usage by renewable
energy usage is essential in order for our global environment to have a sustainable
future. However, most renewable energy sources are dependent on unpredictable
weather conditions. The intermittent nature of this productionmeans that a renew-
able energy prosumer may sometimes produce more energy or less energy than
needed. In order for renewable energy to be more economically viable, there needs
to be a scheme for sharing energy among prosumers so that those with excess en-
ergy can give it to those with energy deficiency. That is the task addressed in this
thesis.
The way to deal with this problem is to setup local coalitions of renewable en-
ergy prosumers so that energy is shared within the coalitions in an optimally ef-
ficient manner. As explained at the beginning three chapters in this work, finding
such an optimal coalition arrangement is an example of a Coalition StructureGener-
ation (CSG) problem. The easiest way to find an optimal solution for a given pool
of prosumer agents in these circumstances is to examine every possible coalition
partition (coalition structure) and evaluate its comparative utility. This is known
as an “exhaustive search” (ES) and can be computationally expensive. As shown
earlier, the number of such evaluations in ES, even for a pool of twenty agents, can
be in the tens of trillions.
The problem for us in the renewable energy domain is that because of the con-
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stantly changing weather conditions among the scattered prosumers, the CSG op-
timisation calculation must be carried out every hour of the day. This means that
the ES approach in the CSG optimisation calculation is computationally intractable
for a reasonable number of prosumer agents. Therefore, a more computationally
feasible stochastic optimisation method must be used, which searches the coalition
structure search space in order to find a reasonably good solution, even if it is not
the global optimum.
To this end, a number of stochastic optimisation search methods have been in-
vestigated in this thesis, including some of our own novel extensions to existing
approaches. These search methods have been examined with respect to two dif-
ferent connection arrangements – (1) when the local prosumer networks have a
connection to a public utility power grid and can therefore buy needed energy (at
a high price) from the grid and sell excess energy (at a low price) to the grid and
(2) when the local prosumer networks are isolated from any public utility, which
is referred to as “island mode”. The overall goal of these investigations has been to
find an optimisation approach that is near-optimal (near the global optimum of the
given search space) and is computationally efficient (i.e. it does not require a vast
amount of computer memory or running time).
Based on these empirical examinations, which have employed realistic parame-
ters drawn from existing consumption and renewable energy data sets, the follow-
ing conclusions concerning renewable energy can be drawn:
• It is feasible to employ ordinary computer resources to obtain near-optimal
energy-sharing coalition structures on an hourly basis that will lead to a more
effective and economical use of renewable energy.
• This energy-sharing approach will contribute to a more rapid adoption of ex-
isting renewable energy equipment and infrastructure.
The principal contributions of this thesis to these ends are as follows:
• A new modelling framework has been set up that can be used for extensive
empirical determinations of near-optimal energy-sharing coalition structures.
Based on the condition of every prosumerwith either a deficit or a surplus, the
proposed model can have profits for prosumers in the alliance by repeatedly
forming coalitions. In such an approach, every prosumer may make more
profit by sharing energy in the alliance before trading with utilities.
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• A detailed empirical study has examined the relative capabilities in this con-
text of various optimal coalition structure search methods, including genetic
algorithms (GA), dynamic programming (DP), particle swarm optimisation
(PSO), population-based incremental learning (PBIL), and several variants
to PBIL. Since the exhaustive search and its improved methods are ineffi-
cient and not scalable for the application of our coalition model, we have
proposed an improved stochastic algorithm, named Top-k Merit Weighting
Population-Based Incremental Learning (PBIL-MW), to generate an optimal
coalition model and maximise the benefit of the alliance. When comparing
existing state-of-the-art methods with the proposed PBIL-MW algorithm, the
latter not only optimises power-sharingwithin the alliance in our experiments,
but also outperforms the state-of-the-artmethods by delivering faster running
speeds and consuming fewer computer resources.
• Furthermore, we have also proposed a new scalable approach, namely, Hier-
archical PBIL-MW (H-PBIL-MW), to solve a coalition formation with a large
number of agents in an extended region. Our results have revealed the promis-
ing potential of applying the H-PBIL-MWalgorithm to deal with co-operative
coalitions across extensive areaswhere there are constraints, such as landform
restrictions, in multi-areas which power-share.
• Theproposedmethod for sharing renewable energy among themembers (pro-
sumers) in an alliance can be directly applied to smart grids by repeatedly
forming coalitions. Consequently, prosumers can share renewable energy
with other members and may make more profit in comparison with trading
energy with the utilities.
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7.2 Limitations
Some of the limitations of this study are listed below:
• The model assumes that prosumers will voluntarily submit to the rules of
the trading society, and will not cheat when reporting energy production and
consumption.
• The model may still approach computational infeasibility when the number
of agents increases to tens of thousands.
• Utility associated with energy is measured on a linear scale in this model sim-
ilar to money. Thus, larger amounts of energy excess or deficit, which could
have non-linear impacts on prosumers, are still only considered in accordance
with linear proportions.
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7.3 Future Work
Future work concerning this study may involve examining a wider range of
energy-producing mechanisms and approaches. There could also be more prac-
tical tests of this model involving the interconnections among real wind farms and
various prosumers who have solar panels. The model could involve variable rate
schemes that could be applied when there are severe energy shortages in some ar-
eas. One could also investigate the possibilities of prosumers storing energy credits
that could be cashed in at a later time if suitable energy storage devices were avail-
able.
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